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THE CANADA-UNITED STATES
CONTROVERSY OVER THE COLUMBIA RIVERf
RALPH W. JOHNSON*
In a comprehensive study of the recent dispute between Canada
and the United States over the Columbia River, Professor Johnson
traces its history through the birth of the Harmon doctrine in 1898,
the signing of the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909, and the first
Canadian claim to downstream benefits in the early 1950's. Against
this background, he analyzes the negotiations and events-particu-
larly the Canadian proposals to divert the Columbia into the Fraser,
and to develop the Peace River instead of the Columbia-that culmi-
nated in the Columbia River Treaty in 1961. Before Canadian
ratification of the Treaty, however, additional problems presented
by the split between the Provincial and National governments had
to be resolved. Their resolution brought about the signing of a
Protocol with the United States in 1964, as well as ratification of
the Treaty. Finally, Professor Johnson comments on the benefits
accruing to each nation from the Treaty and its potential impact on
future Canadian-United States relations.
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INTRODUCTION
The Columbia River dispute is settled. The Columbia River Treaty
and Protocol of October 1964, which closed the dispute, stand as major
achievements in the joint development of a great international river.
The culmination of twenty years of studies, investigations, and negotia-
tions, these documents embody important new principles, likely to
exert a profound influence on the development of international rivers
throughout the world.
The Treaty ended one of the bitterest debates ever waged between
Canada and the United States. The record of these debates runs to
many thousands of pages and covers virtually every conceivable aspect
of engineering, economic, legal, hydrological, and geographical data
that could be unearthed. Few, if any, international river conflicts ever
have been examined so thoroughly, debated so vigorously, or written
about so fully.
It is partly because of the mass of this data that this study has been
undertaken. Its principal objective is to present an orderly analysis of
he Columbia River conflict, noting the influence of various legal,
political, and economic factors in determining the eventual outcome.
It starts with a brief resum6 of the historical and geographical back-
ground, pointing out especially the influence of the important 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty. It then traces the dispute from the 1944
reference of the joint development issue to the International Joint
Coimission, through the settlement embodied in the 1961 Treaty and
1.964 Protocol. The study also examines the implications of the Colum-
bia River case for development of international rivers elsewhere.
'At the time of this writing joint development of the River is moving
ead rapidly. The broad outlines of the plan can be easily traced.
Canada has agreed to build several large storage reservoirs on the
tpper Columbia, in Canada, to capture the flooding spring waters and
hold them for gradual release throughout the low-flow months of the
year. This levelling will make possible the generation of much more
power in the United States than was possible previously, when the
River fluctuated so radically. The storage will also reduce the risk
of floods downstream in the United States.
In return, Canada will become entitled to one-half the additional
power generated in the United States as a result of this levelling
process. Canada has agreed to sell its downstream-power-entitlement
to the United States for the first thirty years, and has already received
[VoL. 41 : 676
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the sale price of 254 million dollars. In addition Canada will receive
from the United States cash payments over the life of the Treaty for
the flood control benefits bestowed on the latter country.
Several important generalizations can be made from this controversy
and its settlement:
First, the Harmon Doctrine, which has played a significant role in
international river law over the past sixty years, was soundly dis-
credited. Briefly, this doctrine suggests that a sovereign nation can do
as it pleases with the portion of an international river found within its
borders, regardless of the impact on the downstream nation. Although
most lawyers in the United States as well as in Canada were agreed
that this doctrine was embodied in the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty,
they were also agreed that it was not the appropriate formula for
settling this or any other international river dispute. Similarly the
riparian and the appropriation systems, both of which appear in the
internal laws of the two countries, were tested and found inadequate as
a basis for settling international river disputes. They were designed,
it was said, for handling private conflicts between individuals and
offered little to the solution of an international problem where a whole
river basin was involved. The equitable apportionment principle, on
the other hand, gained enormously in prestige and acceptance. Be-
cause of this acceptance, it had a significant impact on the shape of the
final settlement.
A second product of the Columbia River dispute also concerned law,
although Canadian constitutional law rather than international law.
During the final stages of the dispute, the Canadian Federal Govern-
ment became acutely aware of its constitutional inability to implement
a treaty solemnly signed by it, when its plans for implementation were
opposed by a determined Provincial Government. The Canadian Fed-
eral Government could insist on its right to license international river
projects, and did so under the 1955 International River Improvements
Act, but could not carry out the project without obtaining the whole-
hearted cooperation of the Province.
A third product of the dispute was the reaffirmation of the long-
standing friendship between the two nations and of the awareness
that this friendship was one of the most important elements in shaping
the eventual settlement. Many strongly worded articles and speeches
were produced during the period, but it was unusual, indeed, to find
one that ended without urging a settlement that would permit a con-
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tinuation of the excellent relations between the two peoples. The oc-
casional advocates of unilateral development were largely unheeded
and failed to arouse public support.
It is significant to note that although in each country two different
political parties were in power during the late 1950's and early 1960's,
all four of these parties found themselves in agreement on the eventual
Treaty and Protocol. Certainly the overwhelming mood of the people
of both nations favored a peaceful, fair, and joint settlement.
The Columbia River experience also illustrates the impact of person-
alities on the outcome of negotiations. Although many such person-
alities could be singled out as playing an important role in the dispute
and settlement, there were two whose roles loomed especially large.
Both were Canadians. One was the late General A. G. L. McNaughton,
Chairman of the Canadian Section of the International Joint Com-
mission. His generally competent, colorful and occasionally bombastic
views brought wide public attention to the Columbia dispute in the
mid-1950's. To him, more than any other individual, perhaps, was
due the development of the notion of downstream benefits, and the
eventual acceptance of this notion by the United States. However,
Premier Bennett of British Columbia played probably the most im-
portant role of any individual in the whole affair. His political and
legal adroitness in dealings with Ottawa were sufficient to outmaneuver
and bring capitulation from the Federal Government on the question
of how the Treaty was to be implemented. In the eyes of most of his
constituents in the Province, the Premier emerged as a staunch cham-
pion of their interests.
Finally, the Columbia River experience emphasizes the fact that the
world's fund of experience in international river development is mea-
ger. Few principles have emerged which have broad application. It
seems likely, however, that the principle of equitable apportionment,
which became the cornerstone of the Columbia River agreement, will
play an increasingly important role in future international river agree-
ments.
I. THE COLUMBIA BASIN
A. The River1
The Columbia River has few peers among the rivers of North
America. In length (1225 miles) and average runoff (180 million
'Extensive data on the characteristics of the Columbia Basin may be found in
INTERNATIONAL COLUMBIA RIVER ENG'R BD., WATER RESOURCES OF THE COLUMBIA
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acre-feet per year) it bows only to the Mississippi, the St. Lawrence,
and possibly to the McKenzie. In hydro-electric potential it bows to
none. Its wide basin, 730 miles at the extreme, encloses 259,000 square
miles, an area larger than France.
From its birth in the womb of the great Columbia Ice Field in
British Columbia to its disappearance in the Pacific Ocean off the
Oregon-Washington coast, the Columbia graces some of the most
beautiful scenery in North America. Water from the melting snows of
the Columbia Ice Fields descends wild, timbered slopes to form Colum-
bia Lake, the origin of the river, then tumbles rapidly out of the lake,
and starts the long journey to the sea. It first heads 200 miles to the
northwest in the spectacular Rocky Mountain Trench, then swings
sharply back to the south at the big bend, around the northern tip of
the Selkirk Mountain Range, and flows 250 miles down the Selkirk
Trench past the international border. Just north of the border the
river is joined by the Kootenay, which contributes about 11 per cent
of the total flow, and then by the Clark Fork-Pend-Oreille, which
contributes about 10 per cent. During its descent from Columbia Lake,
the Columbia drops 1366 feet and picks up 40 per cent of its volume
before arriving at the border. After crossing into the State of Wash-
ington, the river flows an additional 745 miles and drops 1,299 feet on
its way to the Pacific Ocean.
Upon emerging from the Selkirk Trench in the State of Washington
the Columbia flows onto the barren Columbia Plateau where it runs
through a deep, ten-mile-wide canyon below lava benches rising several
hundred feet on either side up to a plateau.
A hundred miles below the border the river is joined by the Spokane,
a smaller tributary, and there turns west, flowing past the mouth of the
great, empty Grand Coulee Canyon, where the Columbia flowed during
the last ice age. The river then arcs back to the south and about 200
miles south of the border is joined by the Snake, the largest tributary,
which accounts for 20 per cent of the total flow. It then turns west-
ward, enters the Columbia Gorge where it flows between 3000 foot
cliffs on either side and reaches a depth of some 300 feet. Here it
cuts directly across the axis of the wet, heavily timbered Cascade
Mountain Range. Still about 100 miles from the ocean, the river
leaves the mountains and flows across the humid lowlands of the
Ria BAsINr (1959) (hereinafter cited as ENGINERINrG REPORT); PREsIm 's
(U.S.) WATE REsoURcEs POLICY Comu'N, TEN RiVRS IN ANERIcA's FUTURE, vol. II
(1950); U.S. DEPT OF INTERIR, THE CoLIumA RrVER (1947).
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Puget Trough where it is joined by the Willamette, Lewis and Cowlitz
Rivers, which contribute some 20 per cent of total flow. It then
probes slightly to the north through a weakness in the low Coast Range
and runs into the sea.
Two tributaries, the Kootenay and the Clark Fork-Pend-Oreille,
themselves international, deserve special note. The Kootenay orig-
inates at an elevation of 4,150 feet from virtually the same snow slopes
as the Columbia, but slightly to the east, it then runs parallel but in
the opposite direction for about eighty miles, turning gradually toward
Columbia Lake and missing that lake by only a mile as it crosses
Canal Flats. At this point it could be diverted into the lake with
little difficulty, and indeed this possibility was considered in the recent
treaty negotiations between Canada and the United States over the
Columbia River System. After leaving Canal Flats the Kootenay
flows south across the border into Montana, turns northwestward
into Idaho, then back across the border to the north again where
it flows through Kootenay Lake and into the Columbia. Thus, the
first 150 and the last 100 miles of the Kootenay River are in Canada
and the middle 130 miles are in the United States.
The Clark Fork-Pend-Oreille originates in Montana, far south of
the border, and flows northwesterly until just eleven miles before
emptying into the Columbia where it crosses into Canada. One of the
major tributaries of the Clark Fork-Pend-Oreille, the Flathead River,
starts in Canada and flows southerly to join it near the Idaho-Montana
border.
B. Climate in the Basin
To the west of the Cascade Mountains in Washington most of the
precipitation falls in the form of rain during the winter months and
runs off gradually throughout the winter. To the east of these moun-
tains and throughout the Canadian portion of the basin, precipitation
tends to fall in the form of snow that accumulates during the winter
months and is released to the river quite suddenly with the spring
thaw in May, June, and July. The mean monthly discharge during
the highest flows of record is thirty to thirty-five times the mean
monthly discharge during the lowest flows along the main stream and
major tributaries east of the Cascades, while the difference in in-
stantaneous peak and low flows is on the order of 300 to one.
The Columbia flows through widely varying physiographic regions,
[VOL. 41 : 676
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ranging from extreme wet on the upper and lower reaches, to extreme
dry on the central plateau. The prevailing southwest winds, coming
off the Pacific Ocean, dump up to 150 inches of rain per year on the
Columbia Mountains in Canada and on the Cascade and Coast Ranges
in the United States. The Puget Trough averages thirty to forty
inches of rain. The central plateau to the east, in the rain shadow
of the Cascades, receives less than ten inches of rainfall per year, and
thus serious droughts are commonplace.
Temperatures also vary considerably between various parts of the
river basin. In the Puget Trough to the west of the Cascades where
the maritime influence dominates, the mean annual temperature is
fifty to fifty-three degrees Fahrenheit; temperatures are generally mild
and vary little from summer to winter. In the Eastern Washington
plateau region and in the Canadian part of the basin the summer and
winter temperatures are subject to greater variation and the mean
annual temperature approximates forty degrees Fahrenheit.
C. Economy and Population of the Region2
The economy of the whole Pacific Northwest, including the Colum-
bia Basin, is based heavily on natural resources and is still largely
extractive, although a growing number of manufacturing industries
have been attracted into the region in the past twenty years. Timber,
minerals, fish and agriculture are the mainstays, with recreation grad-
ually gaining in importance. Some of the industry operating in the
basin was encouraged to locate there by the available cheap hydro-
electric energy.
By many standards much of the Columbia Basin is sparsely settled;
in 1955 some parts of the basin were occupied by only one or two
persons per square mile. At the other extreme, Multnomah County,
Oregon, probably the most densely populated county in the basin,
crowded 1,112 persons into each square mile. In general, population
is much more heavily concentrated in the United States part of the
basin than in the Canadian part. Of the 3,283,000 people estimated
to live in the basin in 1955, only 7 per cent lived in Canada. Urban
areas of the United States contained about 50 per cent of these people.
'See BRITISH COLUmBIA NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE, INVENTORY OF THE
NATURAL RESOURCES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (1964); FREtmN & U'ToN, WASHING-
TON STATE RESOURCES (2d ed. 1957); HowAY, SAGE & ANGUS, BRITISH COLUMBIA
AND THE UNITED STATES (1942); U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, THE COLUmBI RVER(1947).
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In Canada the population is scattered in a series of small nucleated
settlements close to the river, whereas in the United States, it is more
widely dispersed. Interestingly, some of the largest population centers
of the Pacific Northwest are not in the basin, but are located on the
coast in the Seattle metropolitan area (1,107,213) and in and around
Vancouver, British Columbia (725,000).
D. Power3
The Columbia ranks among the world's greatest power-producing
rivers. Excellently situated for this purpose, it descends over 2,500
feet from origin to sea, and flows for the most part in deep, narrow
canyons where few people have settled, and where dams can be eco-
nomically built.
Most of the better dam sites are located in the United States. This
has been used to advantage by the Americans, who have, since the
construction of the Bonneville Dam in 1933 about 100 miles from the
mouth, developed nearly all such sites. Almost 1,299 feet, the total
head south of the border, has been captured behind dams and now
generates power. When the dams under construction are completed
only seventy-seven feet of free fall will remain on this 745 mile stretch.
Ten dams are now operating, including six run by federal agencies,
and four by non-federal organizations.4 One additional federal dam
and two non-federal dams have been started. Upon the completion of
all of these dams under construction, the main stem below the boundary
will have an installed capacity of 9.8 million kilowatts and about 5.7
million acre-feet of storage usable for power production. These de-
velopments cost the United States about 2.74 billion dollars to install.'
An additional ninety-three hydro-electric power plants, each having
over 1,000 kilowatts of installed capacity, operated on tributaries of
the Columbia in the United States in 1959. Fifty-six of these have an
installed capacity of 10,000 kilowatts or more. A number of other
dams have been built since 1959, and there is currently an active
program for construction of additional plants.
North of the border, Canada has yet to build its first dam on the
main stem of the Columbia, although it has constructed three on the
'See Bessey, Pacific Northwest Regional Planning-A Review, STATE OF WASH
Div. PowER RESOURCES BULL. No. 6 (1963).
'Federal: Grand Coulee, Chief Joseph, McNary, John Day, The Dalles, Bonne-
ville.
Non-federal (PUD) : Priest Rapids, Wanapum, Rocky Reach, Rock Island.
'Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty, an International Evaluation, Resources
for the Future, Inc., Reprint No. 42, Sept. 1963.
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MAJOR PROJECTS PROPOSED AND
CONSTRUCTED ON THE COLUMBIA RIVER
AND MAJOR TRIBUTARIES*
*Reprinted with permission of the
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
lower Kootenay.' The Canadian portion of the Columbia has a signi-
ficant hydro-electric potential, dropping some 1,366 feet from Colum-
bia Lake to the border; however, thus far the power demands of
Three dams have been constructed on the lower Kootenay, below Kootenay Lake,
with a total installed capacity of about 271,000 kw., and one dam has been built on
the short stretch of the Pend-Oreille River that lies in Canada. This dam has an in-
stalled capacity of 181,000 kw.
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British Columbia have not justified construction of dams in this area.
Joint development of the Columbia by the riparian states is essential
if the maximum power potential of the river is to be realized. The
bulk of the Columbia's power potential comes from the water that
crosses into the United States from Canada. Peak runoff from Cana-
dian sources occurs in May, June, and July, at the time of the spring
thaw. During these months the river's flow at times reaches as much
as thirty times the volume in the low-flow months of January and
February; this dramatizes the need for a steady, relatively stable flow
throughout the year as a requisite to the most efficient use of power
generating facilities.' Large storage reservoirs are needed to level the
flow. Those in use and available in the United States are not adequate
for this purpose. The most efficient remaining sites are in Canada,
in the Selkirk and Rocky Mountain Trenches.' Needless to say, these
sites can only be developed by, or with the consent of, the Canadians.
E. Irrigation
Joint development of the Columbia has little to do with irrigation,
either in Canada or the United States. With the aid of dams about
five million acres of land have been brought under irrigation and
cultivation in the Columbia Basin south of the border. It is estimated
that an additional three million acres will be put under irrigation in
the foreseeable future. Presently Canada has about 140,000 acres
under irrigation in the basin and may have as much as 540,000 by the
year 2010.1
Although the basin's largest irrigated acreage is on tributaries in
Idaho (2.5 million acres), the largest such area on the main stem is in
Washington's Columbia Basin Project, just north of the confluence of
the Columbia and the Snake. Here, supplied by waters from the
Grand Coulee Dam, about 350,000 acres have been brought under
irrigation to date, with another 650,000 planned. Whereas, because
of light rainfall, the land previously could be used only for dry wheat
farming, irrigation now permits the growth of beans, potatoes, alfalfa,
peas and sugar beets. The water for the project comes from the main
stem of the river at Grand Coulee Dam. °
' Krutilla, op. cit. supra note 5, at 5.
'Id. at 6.
ENGiNEmING REPoRT 51.
" Power generated there is used to pump spring flood waters up 280 feet into an
equaling reservoir called Banks Lake, a lake formed by damming a section of an
abandoned water course in which the Columbia flowed in the last ice age. Water
stored in Banks Lake is released during the dry summer months for use by farmers to
the south.
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F. Commercial Fishery"
Virtually all commercial fishing on the Columbia originates in the
United States. The only commercially valuable fish is the salmon.
Over the past thirty years the number of salmon in the river has
declined steadily as a result of excessive fishing, high dams, and pollu-
tion, 2 all originating on the United States side of the border. Fish
ladders and similar devices have proven only partially successful.
Grand Coulee Dam is too high for any fish to pass, so no salmon ever
reach Canada. There is no reason to believe that Canada's plans for
the Columbia will significantly affect the fish population.
G. Navigation'
3
Navigation is important only on the lower 270 miles of the Columbia,
all of which is located in the United States. A dredged depth of forty
feet permits ocean-going vessels to steam to Portland, 100 miles upriver
from the sea, and makes that city an important seaport. At Portland
shippers transfer cargoes to barges, and in a channel dredged to
twenty-seven feet, tug them upriver seventy miles, through locks at
Bonneville Dam, to The Dalles, Oregon. Navigation for smaller tugs
and barges is possible on up the river another 100 miles to Pasco,
Washington at the mouth of the Snake, through locks at The Dalles
-nd McNary Dams. The John Day Dam, now under construction in
this stretch of the river, will also contain locks; upon its completion
ships will have slack water navigation, i.e., will not have to contend
with any appreciable current for the entire Bonneville Dam to Pasco
stretch behind the four dams.
Commercial ships and barges have never operated successfully above
Pasco, Washington, and certainly not to the Canadian border. There
are no Canadian ports on the river. No question of navigational rights
for Canadian vessels has been raised since shortly after the boundary
was settled in 1846.
If Canada were to divert water from the Columbia and carry it to
another watershed, conceivably some interference with navigation on
U See Craig & Hacker, The History and Developmeni of the Fisheries of the
Coluinbia River, U.S. DFP'T OF INTERIOR, BuREAu OF FiSHERIES BuLL. No. 32 (1940);
Gangmark & Fulton, Status of Columbia River Blueback Sahnw Runs, 1951, U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC REP. No. 74 (April
1952) ; Rich, A Survey of the Columbia River and Its Tributaries with Special
Reference to the Management of Its Fishery Resources, U.S. DEP'r. OF INTERIOR,
FisH & WILDLIFE SERVICE SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC RaE. No. 51 (May 1948).
1The average number of cases packed is less than half of what it was in the
1920's. Pacific Fisherman, Jan. 25, 1955, p. 110.
" See Bessey, supra note 3; ENGIRINxG REPORT 57-58.
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the lower river might result. There has never been any prospect,
however, of diversions of water by Canada in sufficient quantities to
affect navigation on the lower Columbia. Furthermore, Canada is
bound by article II of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, 14 to assure
that ample water is left in the river for navigational purposes.
H. Flood Control15
The largest flood on the Columbia ever recorded occurred in 1894
when the discharge at The Dalles was estimated at 1.24 million cubic
feet per second. A 1948 flood that caused about 100 million dollars
in damage on the lower river was estimated to contain 1.01 million
cubic feet per second at The Dalles. The Corps of Engineers has
estimated that between 18 and 21 million acre-feet of storage would
be required to reduce a flood of 1894 proportions to 80,000 cubic feet
per second at The Dalles, and eliminate all major damage on the lower
river.' About 10 million acre-feet has already been provided by Grand
Coulee and other dams in the United States. Some of the remaining
8 to 11 million acre-feet of storage could be supplied in the United
States, but the cost of doing so would be relatively high. Good storage
sites exist in Canada, and if developed would provide an ample buffer
of 15.5 million acre-feet of storage.'7 Such storage capacity can keep
damage in the United States to a minimum, assuming, of course,
that the people in the United States do not build their homes and
industries in the extreme lowland areas that have in the past been
flooded almost annually, and will continue to be flooded from time
to time.
I. Recreation
Recreational facilities have been developed to some extent on the
main stem of the Columbia in the United States, and to a lesser degree
in Canada. There is no reason to believe these facilities, or the oppor-
tunity for new ones, will be adversely affected by joint development of
" Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. II, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548.
'ENGINEERING REPORT 53-57.
" Id. at 56.
17 Id. at 109.
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the river. The levelling of the flow may, in fact, permit riverside
recreational uses not previously available.
II. EARLY HISTORY 8
A. Discovery of the Columbia
The Columbia River itself was not discovered until 1792, although
several adventurous European explorers had earlier investigated the
coastline nearby. The Greek captain, Juan de Fuca, claimed to have
sailed into either a deep bay or strait as early as 1592. About two
hundred years later, in 1775, two Spanish vessels visited the Washing-
ton coast, stopping to provision briefly at the mouth of the Hoh River.
Three or four years later the famous English explorer Captain Cook
landed on Vancouver Island while searching for the Northwest Pas-
sage. The French also entered the competition for the new territory
in 1786 when Captain Laperouse claimed possession of a small bay on
the mainland to the north of Vancouver Island. Another Englishman,
Captain Charles Barkley, is credited with officially discovering the
Strait of Juan de Fuca when he sailed into the Strait for a short
distance in 1787. Captain Barkley identified it as the one visited by
the Greek captain Juan de Fuca nearly two hundred years earlier, and
bestowed the latter's name on it.
None of these explorers realized that the large inlet at Cape Dis-
appointment was the mouth of a great river; however, on April 20,
1792, Captain Robert Gray, commanding an American vessel, was
surprised to find that a strong current flowed out of this "bay"-strong
enough to prevent his sailing into it. A few weeks later the English
ship Chatham, one of Captain Vancouver's vessels, managed a hazard-
ous crossing of the bar at the mouth of the river and explored a few
miles inland.
There was no great surge of population into the region for many
years after discovery. A few hundred traders and settlers were all that
could be found there until about 1840 when the number swelled to
8,000 or 10,000.
It was during the period of 1812 to 1846 that the first controversy
over the Columbia took place, as part of a dispute over the boundary
between Canada and the United States.
1 See generally Frx-mAN & MARTiN, THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST (2d ed. 1954);
HOLBROOK, THE COLUMBIA (1956); JOHANSEN & GATES, EmxnE oF THE COLUMA
(1957) ; MORGAN, THE COLUMBIA (1949).
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B. The Boundary Dispute, 1812-18461'
The earliest dispute involving the Columbia centered around a
boundary dispute between Great Britain and the United States. It
waxed and waned before the War of 1812 and continued until 1846
when the Oregon Treaty was signed settling the western boundary
between the two countries. Both countries' claims to the territory were
based on discovery and settlement. During the War of 1812 the
British occupied Fort Astoria on the south side of the river's mouth.
The Treaty of Ghent of 1815, which concluded the war, provided for
the restoration of all locations, except certain islands in Passama-
quoddy Bay, taken by military action by either party during the war.
The British argued that this fort was really British because the
boundary was, or should be, drawn further to the south. Reoccupation
by United States forces in 1817 took place only under British protest,
and the assertion that the ultimate ownership had to depend on final
settlement of the boundary question.
During eight conferences between negotiators in the fall of 1818,
no agreement was reached on the boundary. The Americans refused to
consider any suggested line south of the forty-ninth parallel, and the
British would not accept a line so far north. Postponement of the
issue followed when the negotiators reached a ten-year joint occupa-
tion agreement permitting citizens of either country to settle and
occupy the area without prejudice to either nation's claim to sover-
eignty.
In the meantime, President John Quincy Adams eliminated the other
two claimants to the territory. In an 1819 treaty with Spain con-
cerning the Floridas, the President secured the Spanish surrender of
all claims to lands west of the source of the Arkansas River and
north of the forty-second parallel to the Pacific. 0 Somewhat more
substantial Russian claims, founded on exploration and settlement as
far south as Bodega Bay in California, were eliminated by a treaty
signed in April 1824.21 The British-American dispute was not settled
so readily. Both sides based their claims on exploration and settle-
ment. One significant difference between the claims did exist: while
the British were concerned primarily with preserving their trading
"JOHANSEN & GATES, op. cit. supra note 18, at 188-200.
' Treaty with Spain Relating to Amity, Settlement & Limits, Cession of Florida,
Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252, T.S. No. 327.
' Treaty with Russia Relating to Navigation, Fishing, Trading, and the North-
west Coast of America, April 17, 1824, 8 Stat. 302, T.S. No. 298.
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rights and access routes, the Americans were thinking in terms of
permanent settlement.
Two British proposals deserve special mention. One, made twice
during the 1818-1846 negotiations, suggested a boundary along the
Columbia River, giving Canada all the land to the north and west of
the river. The other proposal suggested a boundary running easterly
up the Columbia to the Snake, then easterly up that river until it
arrived at the continental divide. There the line would turn north and
go up to the forty-ninth parallel. To the east of the continental divide
the forty-ninth parallel formed the agreed boundary between the
countries. These proposals came to nought since neither was accept-
able to the United States.
The scales began to weigh more heavily toward the United States as
1846 approached. The great American migration westward was at-
taining full stride and an increasing number of American settlers had
moved into the area. Their strong nationalism, fed by a few petty
grievances arising out of the joint occupation of the area, fanned
anti-British emotions high and inspired the extremist slogan "54-40
or fight."
Such a boundary line, along the 540 40' parallel, was neither legally
nor morally supportable. Nonetheless, it was picked up in the Ameri-
can presidential campaign of 1844 and given lip service by high United
States officials. Quite naturally the British would have refused to give
serious consideration to such a proposal had it been made; in fact it
apparently was never made. The British, however, were aware of the
rapid westward movement of American settlers, and of their aggres-
siveness. Also, British interest in the area south of the forty-ninth
parallel had somewhat diminished when the Hudson's Bay Company
moved from the mouth of the Columbia River to Victoria, on the
southern tip of Vancouver Island in 1842. On the other hand, in the
United States, after President Polk was elected in 1844, his admini-
stration rapidly lost interest in pushing the unrealistic "54-40" claim.
Britain's opposition to any such claim was a certainty and the new
President had more serious troubles to the south where war with
Mexico was imminent. Congress put further pressure on the President
toward settlement in April 1846, by passing a resolution recommending
that he terminate the twice-renewed joint occupation agreement with
Britain. Now, for the first time it seemed both possible and desirable to
settle the issue permanently. Brief negotiations brought agreement
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and the signing of the Oregon Treaty in Washington, D. C. on June
15, 1846.22
The Treaty set the boundary at the forty-ninth parallel, continuing
the line already set to the east of the Rockies. The new line went
westward "to the middle of the channel which separates the continent
from Vancouver's Island, and then southerly from the middle of the
said channel, and of Juan de Fuca Straits, to the Pacific Ocean."
Navigation of the channel and straits south of the forty-ninth parallel
was to remain free and open to both parties, and the Hudson's Bay
Company was to have free navigation of the Columbia River from the
forty-ninth parallel to the ocean. Properties of the Hudson's Bay and
another organization, the Puget Sound Agricultural Company, which
were located south of the forty-ninth parallel, were left undisturbed
until 1863 when they were bought by the United States. Thus ended
the first dispute between Canada and the United States over the
Columbia. The boundary established between the two countries cut
across the Columbia, creating the particular set of problems that came
to a head between 1944 and 1964.
C. The Post-Treaty Period, 1846 to 1944
From 1846 to the present, Canadian-United States relations have
been marked by lack of controversy. One of the few effective dis-
armament treaties, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817," contributed
significantly to this atmosphere of peace and compromise. By this
treaty both nations agreed not to maintain vessels of war on the Great
Lakes, and to limit government vessels to those necessary to police the
waterways. As a result of the treaty, and a general attitude of friend-
liness between the two countries, the world has seen the amazing
spectacle of a 3,000 mile frontier absolutely undefended. There were,
however, negotiations and agreements between the countries during
this period which had a bearing on the recent Columbia River contro-
versy.
D. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
2 4
1. Introduction. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty was designed
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to the United States-Canadian Boundary
West of the Rocky Mountains, June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869, T.S. No. 120.
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Naval Forces on American Lakes, April
28, 1817, 8 Stat. 231, T.S. No. 110'/.
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
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to cover not only the Columbia, but all waters that run along or cross
the international boundary between Canada and the United States.
The Treaty was created because of a number of river disputes that
arose between the two countries during the 1890's and early 1900's,
and because statesmen on both sides of the border could see in the
future a series of potential conflicts over still other waters. Thus the
Treaty was not primarily designed to solve any particular dispute, but
was designed to create machinery for handling any water conflict that
might arise.
Except for navigation on the river's lower reaches, the Columbia
was almost completely unused at the time of the Treaty. No hydro-
power dams were yet built or planned. No significant irrigation was
done with Columbia waters. Tributaries were used extensively by
United States farmers for irrigation but only downstream from Can-
ada. It is likely that the negotiators gave little thought to the Colum-
bia. Clearly they did not foresee the particular problem of apportion-
ment of downstream benefits resulting from upstream storage, which
was the crux of the recent controversy.
Yet, when the arguments of the 1950-1960 period arose, the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty held center stage. Disagreement stemmed over the
meaning of article II, i.e., whether it incorporated the "Harmon Doc-
trine," and thus gave Canada the right to divert the river. Before
examining this disagreement, however, it is appropriate to review the
treaties which preceded the 1909 agreement.
2. Prior Treaties. The large number of rivers and lakes on the
Canadian-United States boundary created several problems between
the two countries prior to 1909. Most of these involved navigation.
Treaties were concluded between the two countries settling their rights
to the use of various waters.
The Definitive Treaty of Peace,25 concluded in Paris in 1783, recog-
nized the independence of the thirteen colonies and settled certain
boundaries between Canada and the United States. The Treaty also
guaranteed to British subjects the right of free navigation on all of the
Mississippi, apparently as the result of a misapprehension that the
headwaters of the Mississippi were located in Canada. The Jay Treaty
of 1794 provided that British and United States citizens, as well as
the Indians living on both sides of the boundary, were entitled to
travel by land or water into each country "and to navigate all the
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Definitive Terms of Peace, Sept. 3,
1783, 8 Stat. 80, T.S. No. 104.
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lakes, rivers and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade and
commerce with each other."26 The Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817,27 as
aforementioned, limited naval armaments on the Great Lakes, on
Lake Ontario and on Lake Champlain to certain light vessels appro-
priate only for police work. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842,28
the Northwest Boundary Treaty of 1846,9 and an unnamed 185430
treaty all gave certain navigation rights to the citizens of one country
on waters in the other. The Treaty of Washington of 187181 provided
for mutual navigation rights on the St. Lawrence, Welland, and other
canals, and on the Yukon, Porcupine and Stikine Rivers that flow
partly through Alaska.
3. The 1895 Dispute with Mexico-The Harmon Doctrine.2 One
of the most important pieces of background history to the Boundary
Waters Treaty was a series of negotiations that had nothing to do with
Canada. They concerned a Mexico-United States dispute over the
waters of the Rio Grande. That river starts in the United States,
flows south to the border, then flows along the border for about 60
per cent of the distance that the two countries are joined. In 1894 and
1895 Mexico protested certain irrigation diversions on the upper Rio
Grande by United States citizens. These diversions were entirely
within United States territory, but their effect was to reduce the
water available to Mexican farmers on the lower river where it formed
the international boundary. One of the principal points in the Mexican
protest of October 1894, was that the claims of the Mexicans were
incontestable, "being prior to that of the inhabitants [of the United
States] by hundreds of years, and, according to the principles of
civil law, a prior claim takes precedence in case of dispute."33
The United States Secretary of State referred the Mexican protest
to Attorney General Judson Harmon for an opinion with respect to
-Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Amity, Commerce, and Navigation,
Nov. 19, 1794, art. III, 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.
' Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Naval Forces on American Lakes, April
28, 1817, 8 Stat. 231, T.S. No. 110V2.
'2 Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Slave Trade, Boundaries, and Extradi-
tion, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119.
"Treaty with Great Britain Relating to the United States-Canadian Boundary
West of the Rocky Mountains, June 15, 1846, 9 Stat 869, T.S. No. 120.
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation
(St. Lawrence and Great Lakes), June 5, 1854, 10 Stat. 1089, T.S. No. 124.
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundaries, Claims, etc., May 8, 1871,
17 Stat 863, T.S. No. 133.
'For a description of this dispute see Austin, Canadian-United States Practice
and Theory Respecting the International Law of International Rivers: A Study of
the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REv. 393 (1959).
'See Romero to Olney, S. Doe. No. 154, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1895).
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its legal basis. The question posed was whether the diversions were
contrary to international law and entitled Mexico to damages or to
any other relief. In an opinion which became known as the Harmon
Doctrine, the Attorney General replied: 3 4
[I]t is evident that what is really contended for (by Mexico) is a
servitude which makes the lower country dominant and subjects the
upper country to the burden of arresting its development and denying
to its inhabitants the use of a provision which nature has supplied entire-
ly within its own territory.
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sover-
eignty of every nation, as against all others, within its own territory. Of
the nature and scope of sovereignty with respect to judicial jurisdiction,
which is one of its elements, Chief Justice Marshall said (Schooner Ex-
change v. McFadden, 1 Cranch. p. 136): "The jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is sus-
ceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that
sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such
restriction.
"All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."
On the basis of this opinion the State Department advised the
Mexican Minister: 315
That the rules of international law imposed upon the United States no
duty to deny to its inhabitants the use of the water of that part of the
Rio Grande lying wholly within the United States, although such use
resulted in reducing the volume of water in the river below the point
where it ceased to be entirely within the United States, the supposition of
the existence of such a duty being inconsistent with the sovereign juris-
diction of the United States over the national domain.
Having stated what was considered to be the "law" on the question,
the United States nonetheless attempted to negotiate a fair apportion-
ment of the Rio Grande waters with Mexico. In fact, even before
the issuance of the Harmon Doctrine, President Cleveland had ex-
pressed the hope of solving the problem by joint action between the
c' 21 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 281-82 (1895).
Moore, A Digest of International Law, H.R. Doc. No. 551, 56th Cong., 2d Sess.
vol. I, 654 (1906).
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two countries. 6 Extended negotiations during the next eleven years
produced a treaty in 1906"r which apportioned the water between
Mexico and the United States. The United States did not assert a
claim to all Rio Grande waters originating in the United States. On
the contrary, it negotiated from the outset on the assumption that a
fair division of the waters was the proper solution. However, the
United States did not want the Treaty to stand as a binding precedent
on the apportionment question and so inserted a clause saying: 3
The delivery of water as herein provided is not to be construed as recog-
nition by the United States of any claim on the part of Mexico to the
said waters.
To make abundantly clear what was intended, article 5 proclaims
in part: 39
The United States, in entering into this treaty, does not thereby con-
cede, expressly or by implication, any legal basis for any claims hereto-
fore asserted or which may be hereafter asserted by reason of any losses
incurred by the owners of land in Mexico due or alleged to be due to the
diversion of the waters of the Rio Grande within the United States; nor
does the United States in any way concede the establishment of any
general principle or precedent by the concluding of this treaty.
4. Existing Water Disputes with Canada.4° In the meantime, to
the north, Canada and the United States were faced with a growing
number of unsolved water conflicts. The ad hoc approach previously
used to resolve these problems was no longer adequate. It was time
consuming, and failed to provide the consistency in approach that
both countries believed desirable. Conflicts regarding the Milk, St.
Mary, and Rainy Rivers, the Lake of the Woods, and Lake Michigan
were all outstanding. Discussions concerning the St. Mary and Milk
Rivers, both of which rise in Montana and flow into Canada, had
been going on since 1902. 41
"' Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting the United States and Mexico,
17 TEXAS L. REv. 27 (1938).
'Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Rio Grande and Distribution of the Waters
Thereof, May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455.
'Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Rio Grande and Distribution of the Waters
Thereof, May 21, 1906, art. IV, 34 Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455.
Treaty with Mexico Relating to the Rio Grande and Distribution of the Waters
Thereof, May 21, 1906, art. V, 34 Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455.
"See BLOOMFIELD & FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA & THE
UNITED STATES (THE INT'L JOINT CoM'N 1912-1958) 2-10 (1958) ; Austin, slipra
note 32, at 411-17; Simsarian, supra note 36.
" The Milk River re-enters the United States after flowing about 100 miles in
Canada.
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In 1902 Canada protested against a proposed United States diver-
sion of the waters of the St. Mary, on the ground that such a diversion
would injure existing Canadian diversion works. In 1904 while this
issue was still unresolved, the United States protested a proposed
Canadian diversion of the Milk River which, it claimed, would injure
existing uses in Montana. Negotiations concerning both rivers were
continued until 1909 when settled by the Boundary Waters Treaty. 2
In 1905 Canada complained of a proposed diversion from the Birch
Lake Basin in Minnesota by the Minnesota Canal and Power Com-
pany, a United States company. The Canadians argued that the diver-
sion would have a detrimental effect on navigation on the Rainy River
and the Lake of the Woods, both shared by Canada and the United
States. This dispute was referred to the newly formed International
Waterways Commission for investigation. Their investigation con-
tinued until 1909 when a formula for solution was prescribed in the
Boundary Waters Treaty.43
A serious disagreement also existed regarding the use of Lake Mich-
igan waters by the city of Chicago.44 Until 1900 Chicago dumped its
sewage directly into the lake. In that year a canal was completed
draining lake water to the Chicago River and then into the Mississippi.
The city's sewage was then deposited in the canal. In 1899 Congress
enacted a bill prohibiting any diversion from Lake Michigan that
would affect navigation.4 ' The law notwithstanding, Chicago con-
tinued to divert substantial quantities of water from the lake, even-
tually lowering the level by about six inches, and causing a hazard to
navigation in the whole system of Great Lakes and water ways extend-
ing to the Atlantic Ocean. Although an attempt was made to resolve
this dispute in the 1909 Treaty it proved too large and complex to be
handled thus. It was, however, one of the stimuli in the negotiations,
urging the negotiators to try to resolve other, more manageable water
problems.
5. Birth of the Joint Commission Idea. The idea of a permanent
commission for the study and resolution of water conflicts appears
"
2 Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VI, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548.
'
3 Article II of the treaty provided a means for indemnifying private Canadian
interests injured by the diversion. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909,
art. II, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
"Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of Int'l Waters, S. Doc. No. 118,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, 16-20 (1958).
" Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1121.
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to have been born in the mid-1890's. In 1895 the fourth annual
meeting of the International Irrigation Congress, held in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, was attended by delegates from Canada, Mexico and
the United States. They resolved that an international commission
should be formed "[for] adjudicating the conflicting rights which
have arisen, or may thereafter arise, on streams of an international
character."46 This resolution envisioned a single commission on which
all three countries would be represented and which would be essentially
a judicial body, deciding water conflicts much as a court of law.
6. The International Waterways Commission, 1905-1909. Between
1895 and 1902 several notes passed between the Canadian and Ameri-
can governments on the subject of such a commission. During this
'time the idea of Mexican participation was quietly dropped. Con-
gressional approval of the idea of a Canadian-United States com-
mission was expressed in the 1902 Rivers and Harbors Act which re-
quested President Theodore Roosevelt to invite the government of
Great Britain to: 47
join in the formation of an international commission, to be composed of
three members from the United States and three who shall represent the
interests of the Dominion of Canada, whose duty it shall be to investigate
and report upon the conditions and uses of the waters adjacent to the
boundary lines between the United States and Canada, including all of
the waters of the lakes and rivers whose natural outlet is by the River
Saint Lawrence and to the Atlantic Ocean; also upon the maintenance
and regulation of suitable levels; and also upon the effect upon the shores
of these waters and the structures thereon, and upon the interests of
navigation, by reason of the diversion of these waters from or change in
their natural flow; and, further, to report upon the necessary measures to
regulate such diversion, and to make such recommendations for improve-
ments and regulations as shall best subserve the interests of navigation in
said waters.
Shortly thereafter, President Roosevelt sent an invitation to the
British Foreign Office, and by 1905 Canada and the United States had
each appointed three commissioners for the new International Water-
ways Commission. This Commission was essentially an investigative
body, without executive, legislative or judicial powers. When a ques-
tion was referred to it the Commission made an investigation, framed
"Address before the National Irrigation Congress, 4th Annual Sess., S. Doc. No.
253, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896).
, 1902 Rivers & Harbors Act, ch. 1079, § 4, 32 Stat. 331.
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recommendations and forwarded them to the respective governments,
which then took appropriate action.
During its brief existence several important water problems were
referred to the International Waterways Commission. 8 The Com-
missioners soon realized, however, that their powers were too limited
to permit effective handling of either present or future problems and
they therefore recommended a number of changes. The first came in
the Niagara River report where the Canadian Commissioners urged
the adoption of five basic principles which should govern the diversion
and use of all shared waters,49 and the creation of a "permanent joint
commission," which could "deal much more satisfactorily with the
settlement of all disputes arising as to the application of these princi-
ples." 0 The American Commissioners declined to support this recom-
mendation, arguing that the enunciation of principles to govern the
making of a general treaty was not within the scope of their functions.
Later, however, in the application of the Minnesota Canal and
Power Company the American Commissioners joined in, saying: 51
2. As questions involving the same principles and difficulties liable to
create friction, hostile feelings, and reprisals, are liable to arise between
the two countries, affecting waters on or crossing the boundary line, the
Commission would recommend that a treaty be entered into which will
settle the rules and principles upon which all such questions may be
peacefully and satisfactorily determined, as they arise.
3. The Commission would recommend that any treaty which may be
"' INERN.ATONAL WATEwAYs Com'x PRoGREss REP. 1905-1911. In May 1906,
it reported on the diversion and use of the Niagara River. In November 1906, it
reported on the application of the Minnesota Canal & Power Company to use waters
of Birch Lake Basin. And in January 1907, it reported on the Chicago drainage
canal. On each of these references it gathered valuable data and made useful recom-
mendations.
The following principles were suggested:
(1) In all navigable waters the use for navigation purposes is of primary and
paramount right. The Great Lakes system, on the boundary between the United
States and Canada and finding its outlet by the St. Lawrence to the sea, should
be maintained in its integrity.
(2) Permanent or complete diversions of navigable waters or their tributary
streams should only be permitted for domestic purposes and for the use of locks
in navigation canals.
(3) Diversions can be permitted of a temporary character where the water is
taken and returned again, when such diversions do not interfere in any way with
the interests of navigation. In such cases each country is to have a right to
diversion in equal quantities.
(4) No obstruction or diversion shall be permitted in or upon any navigable
water crossing the boundary, or in or from streams tributary thereto, which
would injuriously affect navigation in either country.
(5) Each country shall have the right of diversion for irrigation or extra-
ordinary purposes in equal quantities of the waters of non-navigable streams
crossing the international boundary. 2d (i). Id. at 14-15 (1906).
INTERNATIONAL WATERVAYS Comx'N PRoGRFss REP. 1905-1911.
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entered into should define the uses to which international waters may be
put by either country without the necessity of adjustment in each in-
stance, and would respectfully suggest that such uses should be declared
to be:
(a) Use for necessary domestic and sanitary purposes.
(b) Service of locks used for navigation purposes.
(c) The right to navigate.
4. The Commission would also respectfully suggest that the treaty should
prohibit the permanent diversion of navigable streams, which cross the
international boundary or which form a part thereof, except upon adjust-
ment of the rights of all parties by a permanent commission, and with
its consent.
In paragraph 42 of its January 1907 report on the Chicago drainage
canal,52 the Commissioners renewed their recommendations of Novem-
ber 15, 1906, criticizing the ad hoc approach to the settlement of
water conflicts and urging the adoption of general principles for this
purpose. These recommendations were finally heeded by the two
governments and negotiations undertaken to design an appropriate
treaty.
7. Negotiations Toward the Treaty.
The Negotiators. The two principal figures in the negotiations,
although seldom direct participants, were Elihu Root, United States
Secretary of State, and Lord Bryce, British Ambassador to the United
States. Mr. Root was assisted by Chandler P. Anderson, special
counsel retained to help in several pending negotiations with Canada,
Mr. George Clinton, a member of the International Waterways Com-
mission, and Mr. F. H. Newell of the United States Reclamation
Service. Lord Bryce was assisted by Sir George Gibbons, member of
the International Waterways Commission, William Pugsley, Minister
of Public Works in Canada, and Dr. W. F. King, member of the
International Boundary Commission.
The Canadian View. A draft treaty-3 was first prepared by Messrs.
Gibbons and Clinton of the International Waterways Commission and
on September 25, 1907, was submitted to Secretary Root. This draft
reflected the previous recommendations of the Commission, and set
forth "general principles" which would guide a new permanent com-
mission in resolving international water conflicts. The new commis-
m2d(ii). Id. at 131.
INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS COMM'N PROGREss REP. 1905-1911.
For the full text of this draft see Griffin, supra note 44, at 12-15.
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sion would be clothed with broad judicial powers. The commissioners
would be directed to act "impartially," "without feeling, favor or
affection to their country" in deciding cases referred to them. They
would be guided first by the general principles set out in the treaty,
and if those were inadequate then they would act to "the best of their
judgment and according to justice and equity. '' 54
This draft reflected the view not only of the International Water-
ways Commissioners but also of the Canadian negotiators. The Cana-
dians were more concerned than the Americans about ad hoc treatment
of water problems' 5 and throughout the negotiations urged (1) the
creation of an independent judicially empowered commission, and
(2) the restatement of general principles of international law in the
treaty to guide the Commission in its deliberations.
The American View. The Americans, on the other hand, wanted
only a "Joint Commission of Inquiry" with power to investigate and
recommend. Possibly it should have subpoena powers, but not judicial
or decision making powers. Secretary Root argued against adoption of
"general principles" for resolving future water conflicts, on the ground
that "the subject with which we are endeavoring to deal has not been
sufficiently developed to justify the incorporation of such a declaration"
(of general principles), or "to make it safe to endeavor to lay down
hard and fast rules of this description which are to govern the unknown
questions of the future."" One of the "unknown questions" expressly
noted by Mr. Root was the development of hydro-electric power.
Also he felt it would be unwise to set any rigid priority of uses, such
as navigation over irrigation, because, although such a priority might
be desirable for some rivers, it would not be for others. Possibly
irrigation, or power generation, should be paramount. He suggested,
therefore, a common law approach, that is, "to permit the commis-
sion ... to declare in its decisions from time to time the principles
which they deem applicable, and, following the precedents thus es-
tablished so far as they are applicable in each successive case, to
build up a system of rules which will be the result of experience and
consideration in concrete cases. ' 57
" Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of Int'l Waters, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
' The Canadians concern is set out in a letter from Gibbons to Sir Wilfred
Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada, written circa Jan. 1909, following early dis-
cussions with the United States relative to establishment of a permanent commission,
and reproduced in Gibbons, Sir George Gibbons and the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909,36(2) CAITADIAN HIsToRIcAL REv. 124-26 (1953).
0 Dep't State Numerical File 1906-1910, National Archives 5934/25.
See note handed by Mr. Root to Mr. Bryce at this meeting on June 6, 1908, ibid.
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Special difficulty was encountered in connection with article II of
the present Treaty, concerning the right of one state, unilaterally, to
make diversions; disagreement developed as to the remedy to be
afforded injured parties in the other state. The early draft by Clinton-
Gibbons provided in section 9 of article III:"
No diversion or obstruction of boundary waters in, or by, either country,
which shall materially interfere with the natural flow thereof, to the
injury to the other country, or of its citizens or subjects shall be permit-
ted without the consent of such other country.
This provision was sharply criticized by Chandler Anderson in a report
to Secretary Root dated December 1907:11
It remains, therefore, to consider what would be the effect of dealing
with questions involving the use and diversion of contiguous boundary
waters in accordance with the provisions of this treaty. The treaty re-
quires the submission of all such questions to this Commission for en-
cision and, as above pointed out, they must be decided in accordance with
the principles of international law combined with the series of principles
or rules specially adopted by the treaty.
Unfortunately international law with respect to the use of international
boundary waters is, as yet, somewhat undeveloped, and the writers on
international law are not altogether in accord upon the doctrines to be
established as to the rights of adjoining countries in such waters.
It is urged by some that waters of boundary lakes and rivers should be
regarded as held in common by the adjoining countries, in which case
each country would presumably have the right to partition its own share
in such waters and make such use of them as it pleases, subject to equal
and similar rights on the other side and to any paramount use mutually
recognized, or otherwise imposed upon such waters, as, for example, the
maintenance of certain levels for navigation or other purposes.
This doctrine seems hardly permissible, however, as it conflicts with
the recognized principle of absolute territorial sovereignty on each side
up to the international boundary line, which principle negatives any
right of ownership in common or joint ownership in the waters them-
selves.
On the other hand absolute sovereignty carries with it the right of
inviolability as to such territorial waters, and inviolability on each side
imposes a coextensive restraint upon the other, so that neither country
is at liberty to so use its own waters as to injuriously affect the other.
In either case, however, the conclusion is justified that international
law would recognize the right of either side to make any use of the
waters on its own side which did not interfere with the coextensive rights
Id. at 5934/6-7.
Chandler P. Anderson Papers, Box 68, Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress.
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of the other, and was not injurious to it, and this applies particularly to
what may be regarded as surplus waters not required for any paramount
uses or rights otherwise established.
Compromise and Agreement. As noted previously, the American
negotiators initially proposed a very limited treaty, creating only a
Joint Commission of Inquiry. However, in August 1908, Mr. Ander-
son submitted a new draft, article II of which was a compromise of the
views of the two countries.6 0 This provision was accepted by the
Canadians and, with some slight modification, was incorporated in
article II of the final Treaty, signed on January 11, 1909. This article
provides:
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several
State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial
Governments on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty pro-
visions now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and
control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of
all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels
would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters; but it is agreed
that any interference with or diversion from their natural channel of such
waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the
other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle
the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place
in the country where such diversion or interference occurs; but this pro-
vision shall not apply to cases already existing or to cases expressly
covered by special agreement between the parties hereto.
It is understood, however, that neither of the High Contracting Parties
intends by the foregoing provision to surrender any right, which it may
The draft provided:
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several State
Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial Governments on
the other, as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing or
hereafter adopted with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control
over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its
own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the bound-
ary or into boundary waters which, for this purpose, are defined as the waters
from shore to shore of the lakes and rivers connecting waterways along which
the international boundary passes, and in order to extend the equal protection of
the laws on each side to cover any injury or damage which may result on one
side of the boundary from the exercise in the future of the exclusive jurisdiction
and control hereby reserved over such waters on the other side, the High Con-
tracting Parties agree that, except in cases already existing and in cases express-
ly covered by special agreement between the parties hereto, any interference with
or diversion from their natural channel of such waters on either side of the
boundary, resulting in any injury or damage on the other side of the boundary,
shall be subject to the same rights and restraints and impose the same obligation,
and entail the same legal consequences, and justify the same legal remedies as if
such injury or damage took place within the territory and under the jurisdiction
of the Government, whether Federal or State on the one side, or Dominion or
Provincial on the other, within whose territory such diversion or interference
actually occurs.
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have, to object to any interference with or diversions of waters on the
other side of the boundary the effect of which would be productive of
material injury to the navigation interests on its own side of the bound-
ary.
8. Interpretation of Article II. Within the next few months article
II was subjected to a good deal of discussion on both sides of the
border. Some of the comments made were very much to the point in
the 1950-1960 controversy. Being contemporaneous with the execu-
tion of the treaty, and coming from those who had most to do with its
negotiation, these comments are most helpful in determining what the
parties originally intended. Relevant portions are therefore quoted
below.
Secretary of State Root testified before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations that the article was "an exceedingly useful provi-
sion," saying:
This provision creates the same situation on the part of the people on
either side of the line between the United States and Canada as now
exists on either side of the respective lines between our State (New
York) and Pennsylvania, for example. It relieves a great amount of
troublesome questions from becoming international questions and sub-
stitutes the decisions of the courts.
Take, for illustration, the situation which Senator Carter is familiar
with. There are settlers down on the Milk River in the United States.
There are settlers in Canada on the Milk River. One trouble we have
had about getting any arrangements about the question of the waters of
the Milk is the alleged rights and interests of those settlers down there on
the Canadian side. We found on investigation that there were 23 families
down there on the Canadian side, and that matters which involve many
millions of dollars' worth of property have been held up because Canada
would not consent to anything that might hurt those 23 families down
there. The best estimate we can make shows that $10,000 would settle
the whole thing. This provision relieves that entirely. If our use of the
Milk River injures those settlers down there they have their recourse
and their rights can be protected in the American courts instead of be-
coming a great international question and having all of the people in
Canada take an interest in it. It simply becomes a question of litigation
before the courts instead of an international question.
Chandler Anderson further explained:
(6) The right of action for damages provided for in Article II applies
to private or individual interests in distinction from public or govern-
mental interests. Any question on this point is set at rest by the use of
the words "injured parties." Wherever the word party is used in the
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treaty referring to the High Contracting Parties, a capital 'P' is used, so
that the absence of the capital and the use of the word in the plural indi-
cates that it can refer only to individuals.
The Senate advised ratification of the Treaty on March 3, 1909.
The British government approved the Treaty on March 31, 1910 and
ratifications were exchanged between the governments on May 5,
1910.
Article II precipitated debate in the Canadian House of Commons
for the first time in December when a bill was introduced to create the
International Joint Commission. Mr. Pugsley, Minister of Public
Works and one of the treaty negotiators was questioned about it. He
answered that article II was "simply an affirmance of what has always
been contended by the United States to be international law, and what
I do not think has been disputed by the jurists of this country.")6 1
The United States conceded that the upstream state could not arbi-
trarily alter the flow of a river when it would impair navigation in the
downstream state, but contended the same rule did not apply to
irrigation and other uses. As the treaty provided a remedy in damages
for injured parties in the downstream state, Mr. Pugsley argued that
this gave Canadians a new legal remedy in a situation where they had
none at all before. This line of argument was also supported by Mr.
Ayelsworth, Minister of Justice, and by Sir Wilfred Laurier, Prime
Minister. The latter was not quite so certain about the nature of
existing international law as was Mr. Pugsley, but concurred in other
respects: 
2
Whether we liked it or did not like it, the United States had taken the
position that international law provides that, except in matters of naviga-
tion, the upper power has the right to use the water within its own terri-
tory as it thinks best. What were we to do? They might do so, and if
they did so, they might do it to our injury and we had no recourse what-
ever. Was it not wiser, then, under such circumstances to say: Very
well, if you insist upon that interpretation you will agree to the proposi-
tion that if you do use your powers in that way you shall be liable to
damages to the party who suffers.
This intense interest in article II quieted down shortly after the
creation of the International Joint Commission, and did not arise again
for forty years, until the question of a possible Canadian diversion of
the Columbia into the Fraser arose. In the meantime the Treaty went
" I H.C. DE. (Sess. 1910-1911) 870 (Can.).
"'I H.C. DFB. (Sess. 1910-1911) 911-12 (Can).
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into effect, the International Joint Commission was created and numer-
ous international water conflicts between the two countries were re-
ferred to the Commission for report and recommendation.
9. The Boundary Waters Treaty Provisions. The Boundary Waters
Treaty 3 did three things. It created and defined the powers of the
International Joint Commission, it pronounced certain general princi-
ples of law about water rights, and it resolved two existing water
disputes.
Specific Disputes Resolved. Concerning specific water disputes, the
Treaty prohibited either country from using Niagara River waters in
such a way as to affect the flow of that river or lower the level of Lake
Erie.64 It also allocated rights between the two countries on the St.
Mary and Milk Rivers. 5
General Principles Adopted. Several general principles were adopted
to serve as guides in the resolution of future conflicts. Some of these
were designed specifically for use by the International Joint Com-
mission, while others were more general in nature. The latter included
(1) the mutual assurance of navigational freedom on all boundary
waters, connecting canals and on Lake Michigan; 6 (2) the creation of
a right in an injured downstream party to a remedy in the upstream
state for injuries caused by an upstream diversion of the waters; 7
(3) a proscription against any pollution of boundary or successive
waters which might injure health or property in the territory of the
other signatory;6 s and (4) a proscription against dams or other ob-
structions in one country 9 that would raise the water level of the
waterway involved in the other country, unless a permit was first
obtained from the International Joint Commission." The Treaty pro-
' Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548.
Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. V, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548.
Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VI, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548. See text accompanying note 42 supra for a description of these disputes.
" Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. I, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548.
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. II, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548.
, Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. IX, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548.
I bid.
70 Ibid.
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vided that both countries were to have equal rights in the boundary
waters, and an "order of precedence" of water uses was established: 71
1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes;
2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the purposes
of navigation;
3) Uses for power and irrigation purposes.
International Joint Commission Created. The balance of the Treaty
dealt with the new International Joint Commission.72  Composed of
three members from each country, the Commission possesses judicial,
investigative, administrative and arbitral powers.
Under its judicial powers73 it passes on applications for the use of,
or permission to obstruct the boundary waters under articles III and
IV of the Treaty. In approving such applications it can attach ap-
propriate conditions, including the payment of compensation for pro-
spective damage.74 Numerous applications have been considered by
the Commission, covering such matters as booms, 75 a bridge, 6 dams, 77
diversions,78 dredging a channel, 0 fishways, 0 a power canal,"' a power
house, 2 protection of navigation, 3 weirs, 4 drainage districts, 5 and
reclamation works.86
'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548.
' Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, arts. VII-XII, 36 Stat. 2448,
T.S. No. 548.
" Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548.
7' Ibid.
' Watrous Island Boom Co., No. 2, I.J.C. April 6, 1912; International Lumber
Co. (Rainy River Boom), No. 12, I.J.C. Aug. 28, 1916.
" Buffalo & Fort Erie Public Bridge Co., No. 21, I.J.C. June 20, 1925.
Rainy River Improvement Co. (Kettle Falls Dam), No. 1, I.J.C. Apr. 4, 1912;
Michigan Northern Power Co., No. 6, IJ.C. June 30, 1930; Algoma Steel Corp., No.
8, I.J.C. Oct. 7, 1913.
' Greater Winnipeg Water District (Shoal Lake Diversion), No. 7, I.J.C.,
Sept. 8, 1913.
¢ St. Clair River Channel, No. 13, I.J.C. Dec. 29, 1916.
' St. Croix River Fishways, No. 18, I.J.C. June 19, 1923.6 St. Croix Water Power Co., No. 10, I.J.C. and Sprague's Falls Mfg. Co.,
Ltd., No. 11, I.J.C. Jan. 29, 1915.
" Canadian Cotton Ltd., No. 16, I.J.C. Mar. 22, 1919, and No. 32, I.J.C. Aug. 16,
1934.
"Rainy River Improvement Co. (Kettle Falls Dam), No. 1, I.J.C. Apr. 4, 1912;
Watrous Island Boom Co., No. 2, I.J.C. Apr. 6, 1912.
L St. Lawrence River Power Co. (Massena Weir), No. 15, IJ.C. Aug. 9, 1918,
and No. 24, I.J.C. Jan. 25, 1928.
'Creston Reclamation and Dyking Ltd., No. 42, I.J.C. Apr. 13, 1940.
"Creston Reclamation (Duck Lake), No. 48, I.J.C. May 12, 1942, No. 62, I.J.C.
July 25, 1950, No. 70, I.J.C. Mar. 23, 1954.
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Under its investigative powers the Commission investigates and
reports on "any ... questions or matters of difference arising be-
tween"" the two nations. Either country, alone, can make a reference
for this purpose. Significantly, the Commission's investigative powers
are not confined to water questions. Any question of concern to the
two countries may be referred to it under this power.8 s The Com-
mission has considered questions involving: the apportionment of
waters, 9 dams," drainage,9 diversion of upstream waters in trans-
boundary rivers,9" design of remedial works to preserve Niagara
Falls,93 irrigation,94 regulation of lake levels,95 navigation, 8 power
projects,9 7 pollution of atmosphere,9" pollution of boundary waters,'9
water resources of a whole river basin,00 and waterways. 10
Under its administrative jurisdiction the Commission has only one
responsibility-to measure and apportion the waters of the two trans-
boundary rivers, the St. Mary and the Milk, in accordance with article
VI of the Treaty.' After holding hearings and gathering relevant
data the Commission issued an order on October 4, 1921, concerning
the measurement and apportionment of these two rivers. This order
is carried out by irrigation officers of the two countries.
The Commission has arbitral powers under article X of the Treaty.
As with its investigative power, the power of arbitration is not limited
to water disputes but covers "any questions or matters of difference
' Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. TX, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No.
548.
8'Ibid.
Souris River, No. 41, I.J.C. Jan. 15, 1940; Souris-Red Rivers, No. 58, I.J.C.
Jan. 12, 1948.
St. Lawrence River Navigation and Power Investigation, No. 17, I.J.C. Jan.
22, 1920; Columbia River, No. 51, I.J.C. March 9, 1944.
'Roseau River Drainage, No. 26, I.J.C. Jan. 2, 1929.
"Ibid; Columbia River, No. 51, IJ.C. March 9, 1944.
Preservation and Enhancement of Niagara Falls, No. 64, IJ.C. Oct. 10, 1950.
Sage Creek, No. 54, I.J.C. April 8, 1946.
'Lake of the Woods Levels, No. 3, I.J.C. July 19, 1912; Lake Ontario Levels,
No. 67, I.J.C. June 25, 1952.
"Livingston Channel, No. 5, I.J.C. Oct. 16, 1912; St. Lawrence River Navigation
and Power Investigation, No. 17, I.J.C. Jan. 22, 1920.
~Columbia River, No. 51, I.J.C. March 9, 1944.
Trail Smelter Investigation, No. 25, I.J.C. Aug. 7, 1928; Air Pollution, No. 61,
I.J.C. Jan. 12, 1949.
' Pollution of Boundary Waters, No. 4, I.J.C. Aug. 2, 1912; No. 53, I.J.C. Apr.
1, 1946.
' Water Resources of the Saint John River Basin, Quebec, Maine, and New
Brunswick, No. 63, I.J.C. Sept. 24, 1950.
""Champlain Waterways, No. 37, I.J.C. Jan. 2, 1936.
"''Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Aris-
ing Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. VI, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548.
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arising between the ... Parties. ' 10 3 Both governments must join in an
arbitration reference. To date no references for arbitration have been
made to the Commission.
III. THE 1944 REFERENCE 10 4
A. The Background
At the time of the creation of the International Joint Commission in
1909, neither public opinion nor the state of engineering technology
had progressed to the point where integrated river basin planning was
feasible. Although a few prophets had spoken out for such a concept
during the conservation movement of the early 1900's, it was not until
the late 1920's that significant action occurred.0 5 Following the great
Mississippi flood of 1927 Congress authorized studies which later
culminated in the famous "308" reports of the Corps of Engineers.
Changes in public and professional attitudes continued to occur
throughout the 1930's, and by 1944 the idea of long-range, integrated
river basin planning was the prevailing philosophy.
Comprehensive planning on the Columbia was delayed by other
factors, too, not the least of which was the Second World War. Neither
Canada nor the United States needed this source of power at that time.
The United States had numerous other sources of hydro-power in the
Columbia Basin to fill its growing energy needs, and British Columbia
still had little demand for large blocks of hydro power. In addition,
much of the Columbia Basin in Canada was then virtually unexplored
territory.'0 6
However, as 1944 approached, an increasing number of applications
were submitted to the IJC by the United States for the construction of
dams or other works in the Columbia Basin which would have affected
the flow or level of water on the other side of the border. The number
and interrelationship of these projects suggested the need for compre-
hensive long-range planning in the Basin. Between 1927 and 1944
eleven applications were put before the Commission concerning the
"' Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Aris-
ing Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. X, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548.
"" Columbia River, No. 51, I.J.C. March 9, 1944.
"This change in public attitude and in engineering technology is summarized
in Hufschmidt and Weber, United States Papers for United Nations Conference on
Science and Technology Vol. 11 (1963).
"' See testimony of Larratt Higgins, Hearings Before the Standing Committee
on External Affairs, House of Commons (Can.), 26th Parl., 2d Sess. 876 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as 26th Parl. Hearings].
19661
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Kootenay River." 7 On the main stem of the Columbia the United
States had applied for permission to flood Canadian lands behind
Grand Coulee Dam."' Just to the west of the basin, on the Skagit
River, the city of Seattle had applied to the Commission for permission
to flood Canadian lands behind Ross Dam. 09
Little public attention was attracted in 1944 when the governments
of Canada and the United States referred the question of joint develop-
ment of the Columbia River to the IJC. The reference was in line
with a longstanding practice of handing to the Commission questions
of joint development or potential conflict. The reference directed the
Commission to investigate and make recommendations concerning the
further development of the river.
B. Possible Advantages From Joint Development
Although some of the problems and opportunities of joint develop-
ment may not have been foreseen in 1944, by 1959 when the engineer-
ing report was completed it was apparent to all that joint action could
have a significant impact on the benefits to be derived from the river.
Essentially, the problem was this: the numerous generators built on
the United States portion of the river could not be fully utilized be-
cause of the great seasonal fluctuations in flow. If these generators
had been designed to utilize the maximum annual flow they would go
unused throughout most of the year when the water level was low.
They were, in fact, built to handle more nearly an average flow, and
thus during the high water periods great volumes of water passed over
them without generating power. The obvious solution was the con-
struction of storage reservoirs on the upper river which would level
the flow; however, most of the good storage sites were in Canada.
The success of this approach was dependent upon Canada's willing-
ness to construct, or authorize construction of dams that would bestow
very substantial benefits on the United States.
Canadian storage could also be used to control floods in the United
States. The threat of flood damage in Canada is of small consequence,
but in the United States is serious. Canadian storage would reduce
I.J.C. Doc. Nos. 23, 27, 29, 30, 34, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48.
' Grand Coulee Dam and Reservoir, No. 44, I.J.C. Sept. 30, 1940.
'oSkagit River Dam & Reservoir, No. 46, I.J.C. May 26, 1941.
Note that the draft was amended on the suggestion of counsel for the City of
Seattle to include the following:
Provided the Ross Dam shall not be raised beyond the height at which the water
impounded by it would reach British Columbia unless and until a binding agree-
ment has been entered into between Seattle and British Columbia and private
interests.
[VoL. 41 : 676
CONTROVERSY OVER THE COLUMBIA
this threat and thereby bestow a major economic and social benefit on
the United States.
On receiving the Columbia River Reference, the International Joint
Commission created the International Columbia River Engineering
Board to carry out the required studies. The Board was instructed
to produce a report and return with recommendations concerning the
best way to develop the river, especially with regard to power and
flood control. The Engineering Board submitted its report in 1959.
During the period 1944 to 1959 the international controversy over the
Columbia continued and increased in intensity.
C. Signs of the Coming Storm-The Libby Dam Proposal
Signs of the coming storm appeared in 1951 when the United States
applied for International Joint Commission approval of Libby Dam." °
The dam was to be built on the central portion of the Kootenay, where
the river dips briefly into the United States. It would have raised
the water level at the border some 150 feet, and would have created a
large storage reservoir extending forty-two miles into Canada, thereby
rendering communication between a few Canadian communities more
difficult.
The United States offered to compensate the Canadians (1) for the
lands flooded; (2) for highway and railway relocations; and (3) for
resettlement of displaced persons. Nothing was offered for the 150
foot "head" of water that would generate a substantial amount of
at-site and downstream power in the United States. Canadian plants
downstream on the West Kootenay would have been permitted by the
United States to utilize, without charge, the benefits of Libby storage.
Canada's reaction was prompt, and adverse. Both the federal and
provincial governments insisted that Canadians were entitled to share
Libby power in return for the physical contribution of British Colum-
bia natural resources. After a number of hearings in the United States
and Canada, where these objections were discussed and alternatives
considered, the United States temporarily withdrew its application with
a view to submitting a different one at a later date.
Later the United States, through the Army Corps of Engineers, re-
designed the dam, locating it several miles further upstream, and on
May 22, 1954, submitted a second application. The offer-or lack of
it-of compensation for use of British Columbia natural resources
" Libby Dam, No. 65, I.J.C. Jan. 15, 1951.
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remained essentially unchanged. Again, Canada responded by insisting
on a share of Libby power. This time, in addition, Canada insisted on
a share of benefits to downstream United States dams resulting from
the Canadian "head." Lastly, and most disturbing to the Americans,
was the suggestion of a possible diversion of the Kootenay into the
Columbia at Canal Flats. This would entirely deprive Libby and other
Kootenay dams of the diverted waters. The diverted water would,
of course, go through other United States dams on the main stream.
According to Canada, studies of the feasibility of the diversion had
been commenced and consideration of the Libby proposal had to await
their completion.
United States protests that the demand for a share of Libby power
and other downstream benefits was contrary to the 1909 Treaty, which
anticipated only money compensation, were to no avail. Canada main-
tained that the Commission had approved other forms of compensation
in the past, specifically in the Grand Falls Dam"' case, where the
arguments for such relief were less compelling than here." 2 Canada
further maintained that in that case Mr. Hackworth for the United
States had tried to establish a United States "right" to share in down-
stream benefits. Thus, both reason and precedent were advanced in
support of the Canadian claim.
As arguments were made and countered by each side, emotions be-
gan to run high, evoking from the chief Canadian protagonist, General
A. G. McNaughton, Chairman of the Canadian section of the IJC,
the accusation that on Libby the United States "want us to give them
a gold watch for the price of a bit of tinsel.' ' 3 Other concurrent
' In the Grand Falls case a Canadian dam was approved for construction three
miles below the point where the river- leaves the international boundary. The dam
would raise the water level along the boundary somewhat above low water mark, but
not to exceed high water mark. The United States through its counsel, Mr. Hack-
worth, claimed to be entitled to a share of the power generated at Grand Falls. The
Commission was not required to decide the question because in fact the applicant agreed
to make available 2000 h.p. for purchase and use in Maine and the commission order
took note of that agreement. Grand Falls Power Dam, No. 19, I.J.C. Feb. 20, 1925.
' Canada argued thus:
In Grand Fails the St. John was a boundary river and the United States was only
entitled to half of the benefits from it. The Kootenay is a transboundary stream and
thus Canada as the upstream country owns the whole flow. Thus it should receive a
share of the whole increase in level instead of only half the increase, as the United
States desired in Grand Falls.
' General McNaughton also said in Hearings Before the Standing Comnnittee on
External Affairs, House of Commons (Can.), 23 Parl., 1st Sess., ser. 3 at 33 (1953) :
"This project is one in which we are invited to present, that is, to make a gift to
our friends to the south of the line of the rights in perpetuity to a large flow of
Canadian origin capable of being used in Canada. By this action, if we should take
it, we would divert a resource of very great value from ourselves to the service of
industry in another nation."
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developments gave further impetus to the growing need for considera-
tion of the overall Basin plans of the two countries.
D. Kaiser Aluminum-Arrow Lakes Dam Proposal
Prior to 1954, the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation
contacted the British Columbia government with a proposal to build
a dam at Castlegar for Arrow Lakes storage. The American company
offered British Columbia 20 per cent of the additional power generated
downstream as a result of the dam. Although this offer seemed
attractive to the British Columbia government, others in Canada took
a different view, contending that Canadians should get much more." 4
E. Puget Sound Utilities Council-Mica Dam Proposal
At about the same time as the Kaiser proposal, the Puget Sound
Utilities Council engaged the British Columbia and Federal Canadian
governments in discussions aimed at permitting the Council to build
Mica Creek Dam. The Council offered to pay an estimated 250 million
dollars for construction, and to give the completed dam to British Co-
lumbia. British Columbia was to receive no money or power for the
1,790 kilowatts of additional power that would eventually be generated
in the United States as a result of Mica's storage.".5
Controversy over these three dams generated considerable thinking
on both sides of the boundary about joint development of the basin.
South of the border the Americans were becoming more aware of the
benefits that might be theirs without charge, if and when the Canadians
decided to put dams on the upper river. There was possibly a degree
of smug satisfaction in the notion that Canada would certainly want
to put dams on the Columbia to meet its own growing power demands,
and when this happened, the downstream United States facilities could
generate about two million additional kilowatts of power, at very mod-
est additional cost. On the Canadian side quite the opposite reaction
took place. The Canadians were irritated at first, and then outraged,
at the notion that no one south of the border seemed inclined to share
the benefits that might be bestowed on them.
U See Bourne, The Columbia River Controversy, 37 CAN. B. REv. 444, 448 (1959).
" Stevens, Power Program for the Puget Sound-Cascade Region, 157-61, March,
1955.
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F. International River Improvements Act, 1955
As the situation deteriorated, the Canadian Parliament, fearful that
precipitate action (or at least action without the approval of the federal
government) might be taken by the British Columbia Government,
passed the International River Improvements Act of 1955. n'1 This
act prohibited construction of dams or other works on international
rivers without a federal license. It effectively stopped further nego-
tiations between the British Columbia government and United States
interests on the Mica Creek and Arrow Lakes dams, substituting the
federal government as the Canadian negotiator. There is little doubt,
evidenced by subsequent events, that the Provincial British Columbia
government was not entirely happy with this result, and tried, with
substantial success, to continue playing a major role in the interna-
tional negotiations.
The Canadians' anger and frustration at the American attitude con-
tinued to be epitomized by General McNaughton. His views on the
obligation of the United States to share downstream benefits, particu-
larly with regard to Libby Dam, were voiced so forcefully that a
deep split opened between him and his counterpart Len Jordan, chair-
man of the United States section. By 1956, this split had widened to a
chasm, prompting Mr. St. Laurent, the Prime Minister, to suggest
that it might be time to move the negotiations to a "higher level ....
There was a feeling that the chairmen of the two sections had publicly
expressed views so diametrically opposed to each other that there was
little probability of their being able to make the kind of progress we
would hope would be made in arriving at a solution to these prob-
lems.""' 7 Mr. St. Laurent noted that he and President Eisenhower
had agreed to hold a meeting concerning the Columbia and were
working out the details of time and place.
IV. THE FRASER DIVERSION SCHEME
It was General McNaughton who in the mid-1950's, after continuing
United States' refusal to meet Canadian demands for sharing down-
stream benefits, pressed the idea of diversion of the Columbia into the
Fraser River."8 Under this plan the Kootenay was also to be diverted.
113 & 4 Eliz. II, c. 47 (Can.).
'H.C. DFn. (22d Parl.) (Can.).
'General McNaughton played a central role in the negotiations throughout.
In hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Interior Committee on the snail-paced
treaty negotiations, the General was singled out repeatedly as "that man .... He xwas
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By damming the Kootenay somewhere below Canal Flats, probably at
Bull River, the lake created would be higher than Columbia Lake,
and the water would thus flow north across Canal Flats into the
latter. This water would then run down the Columbia to the northern-
most tip of the big bend where a dam would be built at Mica Creek.
Tunnels from the lake would carry the water through the Monashee
Mountains into Eagle Creek, Thompson River and then into the
Fraser. General McNaughton estimated that fifteen million acre-feet
of "surplus" water would be diverted during the three peak-flow
months of each year.119
Not unexpectedly, American reaction to the diversion scheme was
hostile, to say the least. Heated argument was generated both in and
out of the Commission 20 The protagonists settled on two issues:
first, Canada's alleged "legal right" to divert, and second, the potential
effect of diversion on downstream United States facilities.' These
issues will be considered seriatim.
A. Impact of Diversion on the United States
Much of the difficulty arose from the skimpy data that was available
on the impact of any potential diversion. Such studies as had been
made were carried out in the highly charged atmosphere of the time
and were released only piecemeal, usually in the midst of argument.
On the United States side, Len Jordan claimed that Grand Coulee
Dam needed all the natural flow of the Columbia to keep its storage
reservoirs full and its generators in full operation. He argued that
during a low-flow year there would be a direct conflict between Grand
Coulee operation and the proposed Canadian diversion. The critical
winter months, when the Grand Coulee reservoir should be filling,
would be the same period when the Columbia waters would be drained
off into the Fraser diversion.
admired, cussed, rebuked, and praised . . . was called a nationalist in the extreme
sense, and also the most determined man." Financial Post (Can.), May 17, 1958, p. 31,
col. 1-3.
See also Victoria Daily Times (Can.), April 15, 1959, on the General's role in the
negotiations.
. Proceedings of the International Joint Commission, April 5, 1955, p. 32. This,
incidentally, is about the same amount that Canada will store for the United States
under the 1961 Treaty.
"'5 Seattle Times, Dec. 26, 1954, p. 8, col. 1; id., Oct. 5, 1955, p. 14, col. 1; Finan-
cial Post (Can.), Feb. 15, 1958, p. 11, col. 1.
-' These issues received attention in the United States Senate. See testimony of
Sen. Neuberger on the Columbia-Fraser diversion scheme and its effect in the
United States, given before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings
on the Upper Columbia River Development, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-25 (1956).
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McNaughton took quite a contrary view. He questioned Len
Jordan's data as to the quantity of water needed to keep Grand Coulee
operating at capacity. Furthermore, he argued that the exaggerated
United States' demands could be met, even in a low-flow year, if
Canada built adequate storage reservoirs on the upper Columbia.
These reservoirs could store water from the high-flow years for release
in drier years.
The arguments raged back and forth. The principal difficulty with
those from either side was their lack of accurate, dependable data.
It is probably fair, however, to say that McNaughton's position was
that (1) if managed properly there was enough water available in the
Columbia to meet the needs of both countries, and (2) even if some
slight risk of cyclical shortage to United States facilities might occur,
that would not deprive Canada of its legal right to divert under article
II of the Boundary Waters Treaty.'22
B. Legal Arguments
1. The Canadian View. Professors Bourne, 23 and Cohen,' 24 Mr.
Austin,'25 and other Canadians 26 argued that article II of the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty clearly gave Canada the legal right to divert with-
out consent of the United States. Mr. Austin contended that in view
of the applicability of the Boundary Waters Treaty, general interna-
tional law did not apply. He then argued that: 12 7
' Armstrong, Langford & Pennington, The Columbia River Dispute, 1 OSGOO
HALL L.J. (No. 1) 1, 27-28 (1958):
Jordan has countered with statistics which conflict with McNaughton's. He
contends that water requirements for existing turbines at Grand Coulee are 130
thousand cubic feet per second, whereas McNaughton says they are 85 thousand
feet per second. Secondly, he says that for more than 10 years of the twenty-year
period between 1928 and 1948, a surplus of 15 million acre feet was just not
available at Grand Coulee. Yet neither of his contentions is fatal to the Cana-
dian position. If McNaughton is wrong in his estimate of the ultimate capacity
at Grand Coulee, it merely means that the period during which Canadian storage
could be carried out is shorter. Secondly, Canada doubtless is aware that 15
million acre feet would not be available for diversion in some years; but its con-
tention is that sufficient storage facilities could be created upstream to provide
both existing American needs and proposed Canadian schemes. It is this
claim upon which the Canadian proposal depends for its success. Jordan has
not met this argument satisfactorily.
=Bourne, supra note 114, at 450-61. Bourne, Proceedings, Pac. Northwest Re-
gional Meeting, A.S.I.L. 26 (June 1956).
' Cohen, Some Legal and Policy Aspects of the Columbia River Dispute, 36
CAN. B. REv. 25 (1958).
'Austin, Canadian-United States Practice and Theory Respecting the Inter-
national Law of International Rivers: A Study of the History and Influumce of the
Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REv. 393 (1959).
'See Goldie, Recent Developments oi the Columbia Diversion, Proceedings,
Pac. Northwest Regional Meeting, A.S.I.L. (June 1958); Ladner, Divcrsion of
Columbia River Waters, id. at 1 (June 1956).
- Austin, supra note 125, at 439. In preface to his argument Austin wrote, id. at 438:
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In the light of the history of [article II] it is abundantly clear that no
legal limits can be set to Canada's right to divert the waters of the Co-
lumbia as she sees fit and that no regard need be had to downstream uses
[except navigation] or prior appropriations of any sort....
2. The American View. Professor Martin,12 Mr. McKay, 129 and
Mr. Jordan 30 on the United States side, agreed that Canada's right
to divert was indicated by the history and language of article II. On
the other hand, some United States writers argued that Canada had
no right to divert. William Griffin of the United States State Depart-
ment was the principal exponent of this view. In a State Department
Memorandum in 19581-- he set out at length the history of the negotia-
tions leading to the 1909 treaty, concluding with the comment, "It is
clear the record does not support the Canadian position." In speaking
of the negotiations toward the 1909 treaty he argued that: 2'
it is reasonable to assume that if either point of the Canadian position had
expressly engaged the negotiators' attention, their views would occupy
a prominent place in the record. However, the record is devoid of any
express consideration of either point of the Canadian position.
He argued that neither the United States nor Canada had seriously
urged the Harmon Doctrine in the negotiations over the Boundary
Waters Treaty, and he supported this position by claiming that the
disputes over the Milk and St. Mary's Rivers (which were settled in
the Boundary Waters Treaty) were approached by both sides, and
settled, on the basis of equitable apportionment. He also argued that
the Treaty provisions permitting the downstream injured party to use
the courts of the upstream country to seek redress for injuries suffered
as a result of diversion was not a confirmation of the Harmon doctrine,
In actual fact, the rights and obligations of the two nations do not rest on the
general principles of international law, which are irrelevant to the matter, but
on the definitive Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 which was agreed to by both
states in order to set out the principles which would bind them in the regulation
of disputes concerning their international water resources. It is to this treaty
then that we must turn.
'm Martin, The Diversion of Columbia River Waters, Proceedings, A.S.I.L.
2-8 (April 1957).
McKay, Recent Developments in the Columbia River Controversy, Proceedings,
Pac. Northwest Regional Meeting, A.S.I.L. 3 (June 1958), 49 PAcIFIc NORTHWEST
QUARTERLY 104 (1958).
'" See Len Jordan's comments in Report of the Joint Hearings Before the
Senate Connzittee on Interior and Insular Affairs and a Special Subcommittee of
Senate Comnmittee on Foreign Relations, Upper Columbia River Development,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1956).
1' Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc.
No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
" Id. at 59.
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but a denial of it. In many instances, because of the different legal
systems used in the two countries, no legal redress would be available
to the downstream injured party. In such cases the intent of the
Treaty was that the question should be referred to the International
Joint Commission for report and recommendation in line with general
principles of international law; these principles, he argued, were "equi-
table apportionment," not the Harmon Doctrine. 133
3. Canadian Rebuttal. Rebuttal of the Griffin thesis was not long in
appearing. Both Bourne and Austin, in carefully reasoned articles
based on an examination of virtually the same history examined by
Griffin, came to the opposite conclusion. Austin argued.'
Article 2 of the treaty was the provision which gave the most difficulty
in drafting and which nearly caused the wreck of the treaty as a whole.
It declares in words so clear that they would even satisfy Mr. Harmon
himself of the exactness of their meaning ....
Thus whatever might be the case for boundary waters, the situation as to
rivers flowing across boundary lines was based on the Harmon doctrine
of exclusive jurisdiction. The second part of the paragraph is however a
modification of Attorney General Harmon's view that individuals had no
right of action and that there could be no claim to rights under national
law. It is clear that individuals are granted the same status to sue in the
courts of the diverting country as they would have if they were citizens
of that country ....
It is clear from the discussion above that the United States argued for
and insisted upon the Harmon doctrine as a general principle of inter-
national law and that it sought and achieved its embodiment in the
Boundary Waters Treaty under article 2. But what was Canada's posi-
tion respecting the Harmon doctrine? Why did it agree to accept it
when it seemed a principle obviously injurious to its interests, permitting
as it did the United States to justify its diversions at Chicago and to
interfere with the flow at other places?
Sir Wilfred Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada, set out in crystal-
clear terms, the reasons which motivated Canadian action :135
I may say that it was only after careful and exhaustive consideration
on my part that I agreed to accept the treaty as it has been written. I
would have regarded the international law as my hon. friend opposite
'Id. at 62:
The "use and diversion" in each country of such waters is subject to applicable
principles of customary international law; except that neither country may
assert through diplomatic channels, on behalf of private parties sustaining in-jury in its territory, the international legal responsibility of the other country
if there is available to them compensation under the law of the latter country.
' Austin, supra note 125, at 420-22.
'1 H.C. DEB. (Sess. 1910-1911) 911-12 (Can.) (emphasis added).
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[Mr. Borden] does, that is to say, that the same principle should prevail
in international law as prevails in the common law and the civil law,
namely, that a man may make such use as he pleases of the water which
flows over his property so long as he does not do so to the detriment of
anybody else....
But in this case, whether we liked it or did not like it, the United
States had taken the position that international law provides that, except
in matters of navigation, the upper power has the right to use the water
within its own territory as it thinks best. What were we to do? They
might do so, and if they did so, they might do it to our injury and we had
no recourse whatever. Was it not wiser, then, under such circumstances
to say: Very well, if you insist upon that interpretation you will agree
to the proposition that if you do use your powers in that way you shall
be liable to damages to the party who suffers. At the same time we shall
have the same power on our side, and if we choose to divert a stream that
flows into your territory you shall have no right to complain, you shall
not call upon its not to do what you do yourselves.... What wiser course
could have been adopted?
Bourne similarly argued that article 2, both in its language and
history clearly embodied the Harmon doctrine. 3 6
4. Additional Arguments-Both Sides. Several other legal argu-
ments were advanced both for and against the diversion right. Some
were made in the hearings of the International Joint Commission; 117
others appeared elsewhere. Summarized, the arguments on behalf of
the United States were:
(a) The diversion contemplated in article II refers only to normal
uses of the water, as for irrigation or industry, and not to a major
alteration in the flow such as Canada is considering.
(b) The United States has never, in practice, followed the Har-
mon doctrine embodied in article II of the Treaty, and did not, in
fact, follow it even in the negotiations with Mexico when the doctrine
is said to have originated. Moreover, the doctrine is not a principle
of contemporary international law. Hence article II cannot be in-
voked to support such a diversion as the one contemplated by
Canada.
(c) Under the principle of rebus sic stantibus the Treaty can be
abrogated by the United States in view of the substantial changes
that have occurred in the circumstances under which it was con-
Bourne, supra note 114, at 450-51.
' A summary of most of the arguments may be found in BLOOMFIELD & Frrz-
GERALD, BoUNDARY WATER PRO13LEMIS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (THv
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION 1912-1958) 167-70 (1958).
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cluded. These changes include, inter alia, the tremendously in-
creased importance of hydro-electric power, and the enormous in-
vestment the United States has already put into its installations on
the lower Columbia.
(d) If for any of the above reasons the Treaty does not control
the rights of the parties, then Canada would be denied a right to
divert under any one of the three major water systems extant in
the Western world, and shared to some extent by both Canada and
the United States.
(e) Canada has no right to divert a major portion of the Colum-
bia's flow, causing substantial injury to the United States, under the
common law riparian doctrine whereby the riparian owners on a
river are entitled to prohibit any upstream use that substantially and
unreasonably interferes with their own uses.
(f) The prior appropriation doctrine would also deny Canada a
right to divert, as the United States has already appropriated the
water of the Columbia to its use and is entitled to continue that use
so long as it does not waste the water.
(g) Likewise, the equitable apportionment principle, requiring
that the waters of a drainage basin be shared equitably by the basin
states, would bar a Canadian diversion of the size contemplated.
Thus, Canada would have the right to make reasonable diversions,
but the proposed diversions are unreasonable and, moreover, the
doctrine does not contemplate unilateral determination of the rea-
sonableness of diversions.
The Canadian replies to these arguments may be summed up as fol-
lows:
(a) The Treaty controls the rights of the parties. Whether the
United States continues to look with favor on the Harmon Doctrine
is academic, although that doctrine has been relied on in recent years
by counsel for the United States Government appearing before the
International Joint Commission. It is not the Harmon Doctrine of
absolute sovereignty, but a solemn treaty which has been adhered
to for nearly fifty years, that determines the rules applicable in the
Columbia case.
(b) Neither the riparian nor appropriation doctrine is applicable
to the case, since they are doctrines of municipal law, not interna-
tional law.' The prior appropriation doctrine is also irrelevant
"s Goldie, Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Apportionment of Interna-
tional Rivers, 1 U.B.C. L. REv. 399 (1960).
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because the water to be diverted by Canada has not been put to use
yet by the United States.
(c) The principle of equitable apportionment is not an established
principle of international law, but is primarily a product of inter-
state cases before the United States Supreme Court. Even if this
principle is applied to the Columbia diversion, Canada could still
divert the amounts of water in question, as the diversion would be
neither inequitable nor unreasonable as to the United States.13 9
Further argument ranged over the legal remedies that would be
available to the United States if Canada were to go ahead with the
diversion, and turned on the construction of article II. The first sen-
tence of the article identifies Canada and the United States as the
"High Contracting Parties," all in capital letters. Concerning remedies
it provides: 140
it is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural
channel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any
injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same
rights and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such
injury took place in the country where such diversion or interference
occurs, but this provision shall not apply to cases already existing or to
cases expressly covered by special agreement between the parties hereto.
It is understood, however, that neither of the High Contracting Par-
ties intends by the foregoing provision to surrender any right, which it
may have, to object to any interference with or diversions of waters on
the other side of the boundary the effect of which would be productive of
material injury to the navigation interests on its own side of the bound-
ary.
The United States argued' that the rather limited remedy pre-
scribed above did not apply to it because this remedy was designed for
injured "parties" (in lower case) meaning individuals, whereas refer-
ence to the United States as a sovereign nation was by means of the
phrase, "High Contracting Party," (in upper case). Professor
Cohen 112 and others 4' soon pointed out difficulties with that position.
Cohen observed that there was another, "disturbing 'p' in the last line
':' See Goldie, op. cit. supra note 126, at 2.
"'Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Aris-
ing Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. II, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.
No. 548.
' The United States argument based on big "P" vs. little "p" was originated by
Mr. Roy Vallance, a State Department legal adviser. Financial Post (Can.), Feb.
15, 1958, p. 11, col. 1-3. He probably took it from the comments of Mr. Chandler
Anderson in 1909.
" Cohen, supra note 124.
"'Armstrong, Langford & Pennington, supra note 122; see also Johnson, The
Columbia River System, Proceedings, A.S.I.L. 120 (1960).
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of the first paragraph of article II where the word 'parties' with a small
'p' is used apparently to designate the High-Contracting Parties who
may have special agreements with each other with respect to particular
diversions of trans-boundary waters."' 44
Professor Bourne followed up the argument on remedies by referring
to the law of British Columbia, which, under the Treaty, would control
the right of either the United States, or an individual United States
citizen, in a suit for damages under article II. The suit would have to
be brought in British Columbia courts and would be controlled by
provincial law. That law, embodied in the Water Act of 1948, and its
predecessor, the British Columbia Water Privileges Act of 1892, pro-
vides that only the holder of a license issued by the British Columbia
Comptroller of Water Rights has a right to the use and the flow of
water in any streams in the province. In the absence of such a license,
a downstream American claimant would be out of court. Bourne
thought it conceivable, but unlikely, that a British Columbia court
might give "licensee" status to a downstream American who held a
valid appropriative right.'45
One of the interesting things about the diversion argument was that
virtually no one suggested that the 1909 Treaty should be terminated,
although article XIV of the 1909 Treaty146 provides that it may be
terminated on twelve months' written notice. Presumably, the United
States could have suggested termination if it felt its position on the
diversion question was untenable. The lack of any serious move in
this direction can be attributed, no doubt, to the longstanding good
relations between the countries, the proven value of other provisions of
the Treaty in resolving conflicts, and recognition of the International
Joint Commission as a useful institution.
C. Comment on Legal Arguments
The legal arguments waxed hot and heavy through the mid-1950's,
but by 1958 an increasing number of people had begun to realize the
inadequacy of the 1909 Treaty to solve the complex problems of
development of a great river system such as the Columbia. Thus, one
writer after another urged a sensible, neighborly, and political, rather
'"Cohen, supra note 124, at 30.
'- Bourne, Columbia River Diversion: The Law Determining Rights of Injured
Parties, 2 U.B.C. LEGAL NoTEs 610 (1958).
"0Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Aris-
ing Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art XIV, 36 Stat. 2448,
T.S. No. 548.
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than a "legalistic" approach to the matter. The Canadian view noted
the impasse in which the negotiators found themselves on the legal
issues and urged the adoption of a more sensible method.117 Similar
sentiments were voiced on the American side. 48
Even while the debate raged over the diversion issue, there were
many Americans who concluded that the issue was moot because
Canada never would divert the Columbia. Three reasons for this
conclusion were suggested: First, the Fraser River sockeye salmon
runs would be damaged if not destroyed, 49 since high dams on the
Fraser, needed to take advantage of the additional water from the
Columbia, could not be surmounted by spawning fish. The British
Columbia voters, many of whom rely on fishing for a living, would
vigorously protest any such action. Second, the Americans had serious
doubts about the economic feasibility of such a diversion,"' and
learned later that a Canadian study on this subject confirmed their
doubts.' The study showed, for example, that power generated from
such a diversion would cost over seven mills per kilowatt-hour deliv-
ered to Vancouver, about double the cost of obtaining power by non-
diversion schemes. Even Canadians now admit the Fraser diversion
was "unrealistic. ' ' 52 Third, any diversion was certain to create ill will
on the American side of the line. This ill will might well be permanent
too, as the Americans would be reminded of the diversion each year
that the flow of the river happened to be too low to operate their
generators to capacity.
"' Cohen, supra note 124.
' Johnson, op. cit. mpra note 143, at 133.
"See generally HAIG-BROWN, THaE LVING LAND 160 (1961) ; Sherman, "Colum-
bia River Power Plan-A Special Report," The Province (Vancouver, B.C.),
Jan. 24, 1963, p. 1, col. 3 (Supp.) ; Pacific Fisherman, Jan. 1, 1958, p. 11.
"a On March 31, 1960, the author wrote General McNaughton asking for any
available information on the economic feasibility of the Fraser diversion. The
General replied, Letter from A.G.L. McNaughton to the author, April 14, 1960:
The Commission was informed some time ago that Canada was studying the
feasibility of the diversion of waters from the Columbia to the Fraser system.
In this connection I can only say that information on these studies has not been
communicated to the Commission. I think you might assume that the Canadian
government would use the results of that study in evaluating the benefits to
Canada of any arrangement that may be proposed for cooperative development
within the Columbia River System.
I appreciate your difficulty in obtaining "authoritative answers" to some of
the questions contained in your letter....
"' This study was only released in February 1964. See B.C. Engineering Board
Ltd., Report on an Investigation of Columbia to Fraser Diversion Project, 1956,
summarized in Can. Dep'ts of External Affairs and Northern Affairs and National
Resources 164 (Feb. 1964). (Hereinafter cited as Protocol and Related Documents.)
" Can. Dep'ts of External Affairs and Northern affairs and National Resources,
7he Columbia River Treaty and Protocol: a Presentation (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Presentation], where the following was said, at 51:
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Nonetheless, the diversion threat and its ensuing debate caused
many Americans to think twice about their refusal to share with
Canada the Columbia's downstream benefits. It was about this time
the Canadians devised an even more telling argument in their favor:
the Peace River alternative! It played a major part in bringing the
Americans to a more tractable point of view.
V. THE PEACE RIVER ALTERNATIVE
1 53
The Peace River lies about 650 miles north of the border, and
flows north into the Arctic Ocean. Studies by the Wenner Gren inter-
ests under contract with the British Columbia Provincial Government
in the late 1950's indicated that dams and generators on the Peace
could supply British Columbia with all its power needs for many years
to come-at costs competitive with Columbia power. As the Peace
River is entirely in Canada, no treaty or joint action with the United
States would be necessary.5 4 The Americans quickly realized that if
the upper Columbia was to be fully developed first, the Canadians
would have to be offered some special incentive. This is not to suggest
that the Peace River proposal originated as a maneuver, like the Fraser
diversion scheme, to change the United States attitude about the Co-
lumbia. The provincial government has since made clear that this pro-
posal was being pushed on its own merits. Nonetheless, it had the inci-
dental effect of posing a real alternative to Columbia River develop-
ment and did, in fact, influence opinion in the United States.
As to the effect of the Peace proposal on American opinion, R. G.
Williston, Minister of Lands and Forests for British Columbia, com-
mented: 1 5
Although the results of the studies which were undertaken for the Federal
Government by the B.C. Engineering Company in 1956 indicated that it would
be physically possible to accomplish the diversion, they also showed that the
economic advantage of such a diversion would not be sufficiently attractive to
recommend it for inclusion in any plan for optimum development of the hydro
resources of the Columbia River basin.
In addition to the fact that no economic benefit would accrue to Canada from
such a diversion it must also be recognized that the many political, legal,
fisheries and other technical problems associated with such a diversion have
rendered the proposal unrealistic.
"The Peace River project is enormous. Much controversy arose in British
Columbia about the timing for it. In summary, Bennett pressed for immediate
development, either before or simultaneously with the Columbia. Vancouver (B.C.)
Sun, Dec. 6, 1958, p. 6, col. 1. Many others believed the project should be delayed be-
cause of the vast sums of money involved and the large blocks of power that would
become available in an area with limited markets. See Johnson, op. cit. supra note 143.
'The Peace River has no salmon runs so development of it poses no problems as
on the Fraser. HAIG-BRowN, op. cit. supra note 149, at 161.
'Address by R. G. Williston, Throne Debate, B.C. Legislative Assembly, Feb.
3, 1960, reported in Johnson, op. cit. supra note 143, at 130-31.
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When the history of this last few years is written, no one will be able
to argue that the Peace River power potential has not had great influence
on international negotiations concerning the Columbia River. I first in-
dicated need for a realistic alternative to Columbia River power when
reporting to this House on my 1957 meeting in Washington. I was con-
vinced at that time there never would be international agreement on a
downstream benefit return related to value created so long as the Ameri-
cans felt Canadians would be forced to develop the River for their own
power needs within a period of ten to fifteen years. Any such Canadian
development would have automatically afforded the Americans some of
the necessary storage on the River at no cost and would thus have de-
stroyed our bargaining position.
You will recall that plans were prepared which would allow for the
diversion of part of the flow of the Columbia River to the Fraser. It was
hoped this would bring the Americans to the bargaining table seeking an
agreement to the benefit problem which would be acceptable to Canada.
However, such a proposal only succeeded in making them angry. When
they examined the plan seriously, they soon became convinced that
Canada would not divert Columbia water to the Fraser because of the
very valuable fish runs which would be affected adversely by any power
development constructed to use the water.
However, as soon as the power potential of the Peace River was
known, a change in American strategy became evident. The desire to
negotiate finally became so keen that it has been difficult to find time to
formulate and adopt a united Canadian position on the best Columbia
plan of development ....
A. Progress Toward Agreement
About the time of the United States' change in attitude, rapid prog-
ress began to be made toward joint development of the Columbia. In
March 1959, the International Columbia River Engineering Board
submitted to the International Joint Commission its report "Water
Resources of the Columbia River Basin."' 6 In December 1959, the
Commission issued its "Report on Principles for Determining and
Apportioning Benefits from Cooperative Use of Storage of Waters and
Electrical Interconnection Within the Columbia River System.""'
And on January 17, 1961, the Columbia River Treaty 58 was signed
in Washington.
Others agreed that the Peace River alternative was the lever that changed United
States opinion. See Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Dec. 6, 1958, p. 6, col. 1; Victoria (B.C.)
Daily Times, Dec. 11, 1958, p. 11, col. 5.
"r ENGINEERING REPORT.
This report is reprinted in Protocol and Related Documents 39.
' Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], 15 U.S.T. & O.I.A. vol.
2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
19661
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
PRELIMINARY PLANS OF DEVELOPMENT
Notes:
The plans downstream
from Murphy Creek are
identical.
In alternative plans
Arrow Lakes project is
eliminated.
[VOL.. 41 : 676
CONTROVERSY OVER THE COLUMBIA
VI. THE ENGnEEuNG REPORT, Avmn 1959109
A. Introduction
Fifteen years of work culminated in the Engineering Report, the
document which served as a basis for the negotiations, as well as for
the disagreements over the treaty. This comprehensive report was
prepared by a "Board" of four engineers, two from the United States
and two from Canada. A subgroup, called the International Columbia
River Engineering Committee, was created to assist the Board, par-
ticularly in its field operations. This Committee also consisted of four
members, two from each country. Some time later a Work Group
of Committee Assistants was established to assist in field work.
Not surprisingly, the Board relied heavily on studies previously
made by the United States Army Corp of Engineers on the Columbia,
especially the portion in the United States. Accordingly, numerous
references to such studies are made throughout the Report.
B. The Board's Findings
Instead of recommending merely one plan, the Engineering Board
recommended three alternatives, any of which would produce benefits
nearly equal in terms of total effect in the basin. Also, any of the
three plans would "approach the most extensive use of Columbia
Basin water resources for power and flood control considered practical
in the foreseeable future."' 0° Cooperative development, the Report
said, would permit "greater use of the waters of the Columbia River
system ... in the three important fields of water power, flood control
and irrigation.... ""'l All of the three plans were based "solely on
engineering and economic feasibility," and took "no cognizance of the
international boundary."' 12 The Board was concerned with the maxi-
mum possible development of the available flow and head in the Basin,
not with the development of an optimum scheme. No attempt was
made, for example, to recommend a formula for apportioning down-
stream benefits between the two countries, although some of the data
suggested the desirability of such an apportionment. 63
"t' ENGINEERING REPORT.
' Id. at 97.
1 Id. at 109.
'c Id. at 4.
"I Id. at 106:
Some of the storage projects in Canada would produce substantial flood control
benefits in the United States without creating any significant flood control
benefits in Canada. Similarly, regulation from Canadian storage projects such as
"High Arrow" would add substantially to the power-producing ability of down-
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Any of the three plans would contribute to a system of power
plants that, fully developed, would produce an average of more than
16 million kilowatts, utilizing about 50 million acre-feet of storage in
the basin."0 4 Opportunities for upwards of 23 million acre-feet of
storage would be possible in the Canadian part of the basin. And,
over a thirty year period it is estimated that some 130 billion kilowatt
hours of usable energy (at a load factor of 48 per cent) could be
generated at downstream United States facilities as a result of such
Canadian storage.' The completed system would control the equiva-
lent of the disastrous 1894 flood (1.24 million cubic feet per second)
to a discharge of less than 600,000 second-feet at The Dalles and
could practically eliminate flood damage in the populous Portland-
Vancouver area, as well as elsewhere on the lower river. 66
The three plans had much in common, including, within each, the
controversial High Arrow alternative. The major difference was the
extent to which the Kootenay would be diverted into the Columbia.
High Arrow Dam, around which much of the later controversy has
centered, would be located at Castlegar, at the south end of the Arrow
Lakes. It was considered as "one of the most economical storage
reservoirs in the plans for development,"M7 would cause flooding of
27,000 acres of Arrow Valley, and would provide about five million
acre-feet more usable storage than Low Arrow. Virtually all the bene-
fits from High Arrow storage would occur in the United States. 6 '
1. Plan No. 1, Non-Diversion.6 ' Plan No. 1, called the "Non-
Diversion Plan" would not divert the Kootenay into the Columbia.
Thus, the Kootenay would run in its normal channel south into Mon-
tana and be controlled by a low-power-producing dam at Bull River,
forty-two miles north of the border. The United States would build
Libby Dam, backing water up over the border to the base of Bull
River Dam. Kootenay Falls Dam would be built by the United States
a few miles downstream from Libby. Four or five Canadian dams
would be built on the Columbia, at Mica Creek, Downie Creek, Revel-
stoke Canyon, Murphy Creek, and possibly Arrow Lakes, and Duncan
stream plants in the United States without significant effect in Canada...
The amount of downstream benefits contributed by a particular storage project
will depend on size, position in the system relative to downstream head, timing
of development and whether operation is cyclic....
... Id. at 48, 109.
""Presentation 98.
'"ENGIMNIG REPORT 99-100.
26 Ibid.
"I Id. at 99.
11 Id. at 65.
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Lake Dam would be built at the north end of Kootenay Lake.
This plan, using the High Arrow alternative, would provide
51,244,000 acre-feet of storage at a total cost of about 3,853.8 million
dollars. Average annual power output over a twenty-year period would
be 16,733 megawatts.
2. Plan No. 2, Copper Creek Diversion.7 0 Plan No. 2, the Copper
Creek Diversion plan, would include construction of four of the same
dams as would Plan No. 1 (Mica, Downie Creek, Revelstoke Canyon,
Murphy Creek) and possibly High Arrow. The difference is that
about 3,600 second-feet of the Kootenay would be diverted into Colum-
bia Lake by a dam at Copper Creek. Accordingly, the increase in the
Columbia's flow would permit construction of dams at Luxor, on the
north end of Columbia Lake, and at Calamity Curve. The United
States would still build Libby and Kootenay Dams, but less water
would pass through them and thus less power would be generated.
This plan, using the High Arrow alternative, would provide
50,725,000 acre-feet of storage and would entail a total cost of about
3,880.4 million dollars. The average annual output for twenty years
would be 16,863 megawatts.
3. Plan No. 3, Dorr Diversion.' Plan No. 3, the Dorr Diversion
plan, would still include the four, or alternatively five, dams on the
Columbia, Mica, Downie Creek, Revelstoke Canyon, Murphy Creek
and possibly High Arrow. However, neither Libby nor Kootenay
Falls would be built. Instead, the Kootenay would be dammed at
Dorr, just north of the border, and virtually all of its flow (about
8,000 second-feet) would be backed up to Bull River Dam, pumped
over that dam and into the enlarged Columbia Lake to flow then down
the Columbia. This plan, as with No. 2, would also include dams on
the Columbia at Luxor and Calamity Curve.
Using the High Arrow alternative, this plan would provide
49,282,000 acre-feet of storage at a total cost of about 3,559.8 million
dollars. Average annual output over twenty years would be 16,753
megawatts.
4. Power Generation Possibilities. The three plans were very close
in the total benefits they could create. Nonetheless, there were differ-
ences. As to power benefits: 172
The Copper Creek Diversion plan shows the greatest over-all power
Ibid.lIbid. See diagram, p. 734 infra.
172Id. at 98-99.
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potential; its average annual estimated output is about 130 megawatts
greater than that of the Non-diversion plan and about 110 megawatts
greater than that of the Dorr Diversion plan.
.* .. The Copper Creek Diversion plan shows the greatest total increase
in average power output of any of the plans. The Non-Diversion plan
shows the greatest power increase in the United States and the least in
Canada. The Dorr Diversion plan shows the greatest power increase in
Canada and the least in the United States. The differences in average
output between the plans and the differences in the increases in one
country or the other depend upon the extent of diversion of Kootenay
River water to the Columbia River in the several plans. The Copper
Creek Diversion plan allows the fullest resource development of all,
because in this plan the Calamity Curve project becomes justified eco-
nomically, yet the Libby and Kootenay Falls projects remain feasible.
The report nonetheless concluded that the apparent superiority of
the Copper Creek plan took into account only physical and economic
factors, and in any case the margin of superiority was small. These
factors, combined with the practical limits of accuracy of the studies,
suggested that no one plan represented the most desirable of the sites
and water resources discussed in the report.
173
5. Flood Control Possibilities. All plans are considered to solve
equally the major flood problems of the Basin. 7 4
C. Reaction to the Report
For the most part the Engineering Report was well received. 1 75 It
was comprehensive, detailed, and had the admirable quality of posing
three alternatives for consideration by the political decision makers.
The authors of the Report freely confessed its one limitation' 7 -- that
it adopted a system analysis rather than an incremental analysis, 17
i.e., it provided comparative data between the three plans, as if each
were to go into operation fully completed. Data were not supplied on
the effect of sequential development. Needless to say, any system
would be built on a sequential, rather than an all-at-once basis, and
7 Id. at 109-10.
17' Id. at 99.
"Vancouver (B.C.) Province, March 21, 1959, p. 21, col. 4-6; Vancouver (B.C.)
Sun, March 21, 1959, p. 1, col. 1. Support was not, however, unanimous. See Seattle
Times, March 20, 1959, p. 39, col. 7-8.
"'See Sherman, op. cit. supra note 149, at p. 1, col. 3 (Supp.).
"'ENGINEERING REPORT 105:
[I]f the timing of construction were to be considered, incremental analysis
might show several projects, such as Dorr, Libby, Spruce Park, Ninemile
Prairie, Long Meadows, and Enaville, lacking in sufficient added benefits for
the costs involved. This report has not attempted to deal with this aspect; all
projects were considered to be constructed simultaneously.
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thus the omitted information would be vital to determine which proj-
ects should come first. Conceivably, some projects might be found
uneconomic to build at all if constructed late in the program. Professor
Eckstein has pointed out that if the system as a whole is being planned,
criteria cannot be constructed for individual projects unless a specified
set of assumptions is made about the order of construction. Typically
the first project in a system will reap very large benefits, while later
additions will run into diminishing returns.
7 8
Dr. John Krutilla of Resources for the Future, Inc., (formerly an
economist with the Tennessee Valley Authority and a water resources
consultant to the United Nations) said the reason normally given by
engineers for this deficiency is their inability to predict what projects
the politicians will decide to build first. Nonetheless, he argued:179
It is true that second-guessing political events is not the function of
river basin planning and project evaluation. But their function certainly
should be to define a system in which benefits are maximized; this in
turn requires specifying the most economical sequence as well as the
most economical projects in a system of works. Regardless of whether
the most efficient sequence will in fact be followed, the bases for deter-
mining the costs of departures from the most economical sequence should
be available for consideration by those ultimately charged with responsi-
bility for deciding on a plan of action.
VII. THE PRINCIPLES OF APPORTIONMENT'8 0
A. Introduction
By January 1959, the official United States attitude toward sharing
with Canada the Columbia's downstream benefits had softened con-
siderably. The United States now agreed that "some" such benefits
should be returned to the North.' For several months previously,
many knowledgeable Americans had known that some sharing was
essential. Senator Richard Neuberger, for example, had suggested in
May 1958, the possibility of a figure somewhere between 20 per cent
and 32 per cent.'82 As much as 50 per cent was also mentioned from
EcicsmI, WATER RESOURcE DEVELOPMENT 123-27 (1958).
19Krutilla, Sequence and Timing in River Basi; Development with Special
Application to Canadian-United States Columbia River Basin Planning, Resource for
the Future, Inc., 1960, p. 2.
'Report of the International Joint Commission on Principles for Determining
and Apportioning Benefits from Cooperative Use of Storage of Waters and Electrical
Interconnection Within the Columbia River System, (Dec. 29, 1959), reproduced in
Protocol and Related Documents 39-55.
"lVancouver (B.C.) Province, Jan. 29, 1959.
"' Financial Post (Can.), July 17, 1958, p. 31.
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the United States side, although not officially. Observers in Canada
had also mentioned the 50 per cent figure.8 3
Between May 1958, and December 1959, the American attitude
continued to move toward the equal sharing idea. It was during this
period, in late January 1959, that the two governments requested the
IJC to recommend "principles" for the apportionment of electrical
generation and flood control benefits between them.'84 It was not
surprising to find the 50 per cent, share-and-share-alike formula as
the main theme of these "principles" when they were forwarded to the
two governments in December 1959.
B. The Principles
The most important principle thus recommended was that down-
stream power and flood control benefits in the United States resulting
from Canadian storage should be divided equally between the two
countries.8 5 Other important principles were also recommended, such
as that each country should bear the cost of its own facilities,8 6 and
that dams and generators should be added in the order of the most
favorable benefit-cost ratio. 7 The report also acknowledged the ob-
vious: that before joint development should be undertaken, both
nations should be satisfied that cooperation should produce savings to
each compared with go-it-alone alternatives.8
C. Reaction to the Principles
Many Americans felt this agreement represented a major concession
"'Ibid.
" 'Protocol and Related Documents 39: "In identical letters to the United States
and Canadian Sections of the [I.J.C.], dated 28 January 1959 and 29 January 1959
respectively, the Secretary of State for the United States and the Secretary of State
for External Affairs for Canada referred to the general objectives of the Columbia
River Reference of 9 March 1944, and requested a special report as follows:
The Governments of the United States and Canada, as a part of their continuing
discussions, have agreed to request the [I.J.C.] to report specially to the Govern-
ments at an early date its recommendations concerning the principles to be ap-
plied in determining:
(a) the benefits which will result from the cooperative use of storage of waters
and electrical interconnection with the Columbia River System; and (b) the
apportionment betxveen the two countries of such benefits more particularly in
regard to electrical generation and flood control."
In the preparation of the "Principles" the Commission used all the information
available to it, including the Report of the Engineering Board as well as studies of
other agencies in both Canada and the United States. A special work group was
established to prepare summaries of the available data. The Commission approached
the problem of formulating principles within the context and intent of the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909."
" Power Principle No. 6, id. at 49; Flood Control Principle No. 4, id. at 53.
" Power Principle No. 6, id. at 49.
"'General Principle No. 1, id. at 41.
" General Principle No. 2, id. at 42.
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on their part. Certainly it was a long step from their mid-1950 refusal
to offer anything for downstream benefits. Some Canadians, however,
still argued that Canada was being unfairly treated. 9 Canadian
economist Higgins argued, for example, that the equal sharing principle
failed to recognize that Canada would be investing far more in the
program than the United States, and in fairness should receive a
greater share of the benefit. 90 His position was that Canada would
have to invest about 394.4 million dollars to build the three dams
that would provide 15.5 million acre-feet of storage necessary to
create the "downstream benefits" at issue. The United States, on
the other hand, would only spend about 130 million dollars in ex-
panding existing generating facilities in order to capitalize on the
Canadian storage.
The difficulty with this argument was that few people could agree
on the costs to be attributed to each partner. Canadian costs were
more easily identified because they involved new installations. South
of the border, however, it was much harder to decide how much
credit the United States should receive for the cost of existing installa-
tions. American negotiators pointed out that their country had already
spent some 2.7 billion dollars on existing installations needed to realize
the benefits from Canadian storage. Canadians countered that the
United States had incurred these costs for its own benefit without
any plan of integrating the facilities into an international system, and
thus they should not be weighed against Canadian costs to be incurred
in connection with such a system. They conceded inclusion only of a
few "attributed costs," i.e., some part of the costs of a few installations
built in recent years specifically to take advantage of possible Canadian
storage.
The argument rapidly became lost in a maze of statistics, too com-
plex even for the proponents of one side to agree upon. Then too,
some Canadians disagreed on a different ground with the basic thesis
of the Higgins approach. In their opinion, adoption of anything other
than an arbitrary fifty-fifty basis, would "create a situation wherein
every expenditure of the past or future and all planning in either
country would be subject to international scrutiny and approval.... " '
The voices of dissent were not strong enough to change the equal
"" See report on Canadian views in Johnson, op. cit. supra note 143, at 123. See
also Higgins, Columbia River Treaty, A Critical Review, 191 INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL 399.
' Higgins. supra note 189, at 404.
191 Id. at 431.
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sharing notion of The Principles. Thus, the Treaty which appeared
some thirteen months later carried this basic idea within it.
VIII. THE TREATY
A. Negotiations
Once the essential principles for an international agreement had
been accepted by both sides, the negotiations moved swiftly. Teams
of negotiators were appointed by both nations. On the Canadian side
were Mr. E. Davie Fulton, Canada's Minister of Justice, chairman;
Mr. R. Gordon Robertson, Deputy Minister of the Department of
Northern Affairs and National Resources; Mr. A. E. Ritchie, Assistant
Under-Secretary, Department of External Affairs; and Mr. E. W.
Bassett, Deputy Minister of Lands and Forests of the Province of
British Columbia. On the United States side were Mr. E. F. Bennett,
Under-Secretary, Department of Interior, chairman; Mr. I. B. White,
Assistant Secretary, Department of State; and Lieutenant General
E. C. Itschner, Chief, United States Army Corps of Engineers. 92
Because of the complexities of the negotiations, a small army of
technical advisors gathered around the two negotiating teams. In
addition, the Federal-Provincial Policy Liaison Committee was created
to bring the British Columbia Provincial Government directly into the
matter, and to present a united front to the United States team.1"3
The negotiators first met on February 11, 1960. On September 28,
1960, they issued a "Joint Progress Report" which was accepted by
both governments on October 19, 1960. On January 8, 1961, the
negotiators reported a treaty text to the two governments.
With surprising speed the Columbia River Treaty was signed in
Washington on January 17, 1961, by Prime Minister Diefenbaker and
President Eisenhower."9 4 With some exceptions, it incorporates the
fifty-fifty principle and joint development ideas recommended by the
International Joint Commission.
"' Protocol and Related Documents 57. General McNaughton was conspicuously
absent from the negotiating team, raising the criticism that Canada's "best qualified"
person "with respect to the Columbia River Treaty" was not there, whereas America's
"best qualified" man, General Itschner, was on the United States team. See 26th
Parl. Hearings 893.
" This liaison committee included Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton; Mr Howard
Green, External Affairs Minister; Mr. Alvin Hamilton, Northern Affairs Minister;
Mr. Robert Bonner, Attorney General for B.C.; Mr. R. G. Williston, Lands and
Forests Minister for B.C.; Dr. Hugh Keenleyside; Mr. J. V. Fisher, Premier
Bennetes Economic Advisor; and A. F. W. Plumtree, Federal Assistant Deputy
Minister of Finance.
..' Protocol and Related Documents 58.
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B. Summary of the Treaty
The scheme incorporated in the Treaty involves a combination of
Plans No. 1, Non-Diversion, and No. 2, Copper Creek Diversion, sub-
mitted in the 1959 Engineering Report. Rejected was Plan No. 3,
the Dorr Diversion. During the first twenty years of operation Plan
No. 1 will be effected. Thus, Canada will not be permitted to make any
diversion of the Kootenay during this period. After twenty years, the
Copper Creek Diversion suggested in Plan No. 2 will be possible.
Canada is then authorized to build a small dam at Copper Creek and
to divert up to 20 per cent of the flow. The diversion can be increased
to 75 per cent and 90 per cent in sixty and eighty years, respectively.
Furthermore, the Treaty plan includes construction of High Arrow,
the alternative included in all three of the Engineering Report pro-
posals. Finally, diversion of the Columbia into the Fraser River is not
permitted during the life of the Treaty. 9 ' The Treaty is to be in force
for sixty years and thereafter until either side gives ten years' notice of
termination. 96
Under the Treaty plan, Canada will provide 15.5 million acre-feet
of storage for the benefit, primarily, of the downstream installations
in the United States.9 7 The United States agrees to operate the
twenty-four power generating plants on the main river and tributaries
and any additional ones to be built so as to make the most effective use
of the storage.'98 Canada will receive its share based on the assumption
of such use; thus, if the United States fails to make the most effective
utilization of the Canadian storage, it will lose, not Canada. The down-
stream power benefits in the United States will be shared with Canada
on a fifty-fifty basis.'9 9
The Treaty provides that about 8.5 million acre-feet of the 15.5
million acre-feet of storage provided by Canadian dams will be avail-
"' Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [19641, art. VIII, para. 1, 15
U.S.T. & O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638 (effective Sept. 16, 1964) (by implication).
' Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. XIX, para. 2, 15
U.S.T. & O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
'Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. II, 15 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
'Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. III, para. 3, 15 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
1" Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. V, 15 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
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able for flood control in the United States,"' in return for which the
United States will pay to Canada 64 million dollars.2 ' Canada also
agrees to provide other storage on an "on call" basis in the event of
special emergencies. For each of the first four "calls" the United
States will pay about 1.9 million dollars, plus compensation for any
actual power losses in Canada. 202 These flood control provisions are
to continue beyond the sixty-year minimum life of the Treaty. 3
After that period, the United States will pay Canada's operating costs
for any call made, plus compensation for any power losses.
Promptness of construction is required by the Treaty.20 4 The Arrow
and Duncan Lakes Dams must be built within five years of ratifica-
tion; for each month late Canada is to be penalized 192,100 dollars
and 40,800 dollars, respectively. The Mica Dam must be built within
nine years. However, the penalty there is only at the rate of 4,500
dollars a month.
Under the Treaty, the United States is given the option of building
Libby Dam on the Kootenay within five years. °s This would flood
lands up to forty-two miles into British Columbia-which Canada will
clear at an estimated cost of 13 million dollars. Libby Dam would
generate about 550,000 kilowatts of prime power in the United States
which would not be shared by Canada. 06 Further downstream from
Libby, after the Kootenay again flows into Canada, the storage pro-
vided by Libby (5 million acre-feet) would produce an extra 270,000
kilowatts at West Kootenay plants near Nelson, which would not be
shared with the United States. In addition, the flood control benefits
that would result in Canada from Libby, as well as those in the United
ITreaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. IV, para. 2, 15
U.S.T. & O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
a Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. VI, para. 1, 15 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
"Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. VI, para. 3, 15 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
"' Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. XIX, para. 4, 15
U.S.T. & O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
1Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. IV, para. 6, and art.
VI, para. 2, 15 U.S.T. & O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
'Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. XII, para. 1, 15
U.S.T. & OI..A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
"Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. XII, para. 2, 15
U.S.T. & O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
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States, are not to be shared. Libby is thus completely outside the
fifty-fifty sharing provisions of the balance of the Treaty.
Each country is to designate "operating entities" under the Treaty.
These will carry out the terms of the agreement on behalf of their
respective countries. A formidable list of powers and duties to be
assigned these entities is set out in article IV, section 2. On the
United States side, the power responsibilities will be assigned to the
Bonneville Power Administration and the flood control responsibilities
to the Army Engineers. Canada will designate the British Columbia
Hydro and Power Authority as the Canadian operating entity.
0 7
A Permanent Engineering Board is also to be established, consisting
of four members, two from each country, that will have a variety of
investigating, inspecting and reporting duties.208 The objective of this
Board will be to facilitate the settlement of differences between the
operating entities of both countries.
Differences under the Treaty may be referred by either nation to
the International Joint Commission for decision. If that Commission
does not render a decision within three months, either country may
submit the difference to arbitration.
209
C. The United States Ratifies the Treaty
Action on the United States side with regard to the Treaty was
prompt. A public hearing was held by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, on March 8, 1961. Senators from the four Northwestern
states, government officials concerned with the drafting and negotiation
of the Treaty, and a number of private witnesses were heard in support
of the Treaty. No witnesses appeared against it. On March 14, 1961,
the Committee voted unanimously to recommend to the Senate that
advice and consent to ratification be given.
On March 16, 1961, the United States Senate gave its advice and
consent to the Columbia River Treaty's ratification by a vote of ninety
to one. On a roll-call vote, Senator Wallace F. Bennett of Utah cast
the only dissenting vote.
' Protocol and Related Documents 103.
'Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. XV, 15 U.S.T. &
O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
- Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. XVI, 15 U.S.T. &
O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
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D. Criticism from the United States Side
Some modest criticism of the Treaty developed on the United States
side of the border. For example, Dr. M. E. Marts of the University of
Washington voiced concern over "uncertainties" in the Treaty, in-
cluding:2 o
1. The problem of an agreement between the Federal Government at
Ottawa and the British Columbia Provincial Government.
2. The absence of any specific obligation on the part of the United States
to install additional machinery to make effective use of the Canadian
storage, while Canada is obligated to provide the full amount of
storage within a specified period of time.
3. The effect of the Peace River proposal on the future market for Co-
lumbia River power in British Columbia.
4. The conflict between on-site power at Mica Creek and releases of
Mica storage to meet the Canadian commitment to the United States.
5. The inclusion of the Libby Dam, which may become an important
concession by Canada and even a luxury to the United States.
6. The need for arrangements to recover downstream benefits from non-
federal plants in the United States.
7. The equivocal position of the sponsors of potential projects in the
United States until future power needs are met by this international
development. In the meantime, the search for additional power in the
Northwest must continue.
Dr. John V. Krutilla, writing in 1961, raised doubts about the
desirability of the Treaty for the United States. Admitting that some
of his conclusions were only "first approximations," because of the
inadequacy of data, Dr. Krutilla postulated that "there will be no
economic advantage to the United States" from joint development.
"In fact," he said, "the total cost of power is likely to be greater over
time through cooperative development than through reliance upon
United States resources alone." He suggested that "a temporary ad-
vantage to the United States appears to be offset by a longer-range
increase in costs over what the United States could have done relying
upon its own resources." 21'
Writing in 1963, however, Dr. Krutilla seemed somewhat more
optimistic about the value of the Treaty plan to the United States,
but still expressed doubts, largely on the basis of the inadequacy of
data collected so far. He concluded that the Treaty plan was probably
Water Power, Feb. 1961, pp. 56, 58-59.
211Krutilla, Columbia River Development: Some Problems of International
Cooperation, in Land and Water: Planning For Economic Growth 91, 118-19 (Papers
of the 1961 Western Resources Conference 1961).
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"second best," although "how far it falls short of an optimum cannot
be adequately assessed without complete systems analyses . 12 As far
as the United States was concerned he concluded that the "Treaty
appears to provide results of uncertain economic merit." Nonetheless,
given the data available, and the politics of the matter, Dr. Krutilla
urged conclusion of the Treaty. 13
E. Reaction in Canada
Compared to the fairly uniform acceptance of the treaty in the
United States, the reaction in Canada was "mixed." There was sub-
stantial strong support. There was also stiff opposition, although it
did not develop until a year or two after the United States' ratification.
Most critical, however, were the questions about "how to do it" that
were raised by the British Columbians. They wanted to know: Who
is to pay for construction of Canadian facilities? and what is to be done
regarding the Canadian entitlement to downstream benefits? Perhaps
it is more appropriate to say they had definite answers to these ques-
tions, but were unable to obtain ready agreement from the federal gov-
ernment. Since neither of the questions was answered in the Treaty,
they had to be decided within Canada, between the federal and provin-
cial governments. Their resolution proved so difficult that it delayed
approval of the Treaty for more than three years, and eventually neces-
sitated the conclusion of a supplemental "protocol" with the United
States.2
14
F. The British Columbia-Ottawa Impasse
1. Background. A word of background about this federal-provincial
impasse is appropriate to explain how it could occur. Such a dispute
could not, for example, take place in the United States although that
country is also a federation of states. The essential difference is that
in Canada the provincial and national governments are fairly evenly
matched on water resource issues, whereas in the United States the
national government holds unquestionable supremacy.
In the western part of the United States the combination of extensive
power held by the federal government under the commerce clause of
the federal constitution, plus vast federal land holdings, permit the
central government to control river development with only slight re-
-
2 Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: An International Evaluation 21 Re.
sources for the Future, Inc., Reprint No. 42, Sept. 1963.
"Id. at 22.
Protocol and Related Documents 110.
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gaxd to conflicting state policies.21 5 The constitutional supremacy of
the federal government in water resource developments is clear. For
the states to advance their policies, they must therefore move in the
political arena, usually through their Senators and Representatives.
Because there are only ten Canadian provinces as compared with
fifty states, and because British Columbia is one of the larger and
more important provinces, its relative political power is much greater
than that held by all but the most populous of the United States. In
addition, British Columbia has important legal powers through which
it can assert its policies as against conflicting federal plans.
The British North America Act of 1867, sometimes called the Cana-
dian Constitution, granted the provinces ownership of the natural
resources including rivers within their borders.216 On the other hand,
the federal government, where the national interest was involved, was
given jurisdiction over certain uses of these resources. Thus, it has
power to act in regard to navigable streams, international waters, and
probably inter-provincial waters.2 17 In addition, the federal govern-
ment has treaty-making powers, although its treaty-implementing pow-
ers are severly limited on matters coming within provincial jurisdiction.
The Canadian practice, contrary to that in the United States, has
been for the provincial governments to license the development of
large hydro-electric dams. In this connection it should be noted that
British Columbia was acting in accordance with this practice in 1955
in negotiating with the Kaiser Aluminum Company for construction
of the Arrow Lakes Dam when the federal government, contrary to
prior practice, determined that it should have a say in international
river development, and passed the International River Improvements
Act. This required a federal license thereafter for works constructed
on international rivers.
Instead of ending the battle, however, this act was merely the
opening shot in a long war between federal and provincial interests over
the Columbia. The federal government eventually realized that, al-
though it could make treaties with the United States, relating to river
development, it could not easily implement them without provincial
cooperation. Before the Columbia program could go forward, there-
fore, an entente between these governments was essential.
' See FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) ; Oklahoma ex. rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irr. Co.,
174 U.S. 690 (1899).
" British North American Act, 1867, 31-33 Vict. c. 3, § 92(10), (13), (16) (Can.).
" British North American Act, 1867, 31-33 Vict. c. 3, § 92 (10c) (Can.).
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2. The Issues. Much of the Ottawa-British Columbia controversy
can be attributed to the actions and dreams of Premier W. A. C.
Bennett of British Columbia, and to the personal feud that developed
between him and the federal government's representative on the
Columbia, Mr. Davie Fulton. 18
About the time the Treaty was signed, Premier Bennett became
convinced that the interests of British Columbia lay in the simultane-
ous development of the Peace and Columbia Rivers. Yet, if they were
developed simultaneously the large quantities of power generated could
not possibly be marketed in British Columbia.21 9 In addition, British
Columbia would not be able to raise the financing for both projects at
one time. The obvious answer, possibly to both problems, lay in the
sale of the "surplus" power to the United States. The federal govern-
ment, however, opposed such a sale, arguing (1) that the power could
better be used for industrial growth inside Canada,22° and (2) if once
committed to the United States this power could probably never be
recovered. 2 '
The federal government apparently thought it had obtained British
Columbia's acceptance of its "no sale" point of view when it negotiated
the Treaty. It will be recalled that a Federal-Provincial Policy Liaison
Committee had been created to bring the provincial government into
the negotiations and to present a united front on the part of Canada.
Nonetheless, a conflict over who would pay for the construction of the
new dams had flared just a few weeks before the Treaty was signed -222
and, as hindsight showed, had been far from resolved during the final
"'8 The feud was widely reported in the press. See for example Vancouver (B.C.)
Province, Oct. 28, 1960, p. 4, col. 1-2. On one occasion when Mr. Fulton was looking
for Mr Bennett to discuss some aspects of the Columbia plans, the latter was con-
spicuously absent, prompting such local headlines as "Bennett Pulls Vanishing Act,"
Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Dec. 10, 1960, p. 4, col. 1; "Missing Premier Intriguing
Case," Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Dec. 13, 1960, p. 8, col. 1. Mr. Fulton accused Mr.
Bennett of being "extremely rude." Daily Colonist (Victoria, B.C.), Dec. 9, 1960,
p. 1, col. 5.
During the months of negotiations Bennett accused Fulton of "just playing
politics" on the Columbia. Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Dec. 13, 1960, p. 12, col. 1. Fulton
responded by charging that Bennett "falsified" and "misinterpreted" the facts. Daily
Colonist (Victoria, B.C.) Dec. 9, 1960, p. 1, col. 5. Later, Fulton accused Bennett of
"reversing his stand on the [treaty], using scattergun technique, coloring the study,
dragging out red herrings, raising smoke screens and generally clouding the issues on
the Columbia." Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Sept. 29, 1961, p. 6, col. 1.
" See report of Gibb, Merz, & McLellan, prepared for the B.C. Energy Board,
Columbia and Peace River Power Projects, Report on Power Costs, and Appcudices
(July 1961), and Supplement to Consultant's Report on Power Costs (Aug. 1961).
Vancouver (B.C.) Province, Feb. 11, 1960, p. 4, col. 1-2; Jan. 24, 1963, p. 4, col.
3 (Supp.).
'Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Aug. 30, 1961, p. 12, col. 8.
'Vancouver (B.C.) Province, Oct. 25, 1960, p. 1, col. 7-8; and Oct. 28, 1960, p. 4,
col. 1-2.
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weeks of negotiations. In fact, just a few days before the signing,
Premier Bennett wrote Mr. Diefenbaker saying he was "alarmed"
about the financial implications of the treaty.2 3  Mr. Diefenbaker
nevertheless signed the treaty, probably expecting to bring Mr. Ben-
nett around to his point of view in the next few months.
3. Premier Bennett's Strategy. Mr. Bennett, however, then became
convinced of the desirability of simultaneously developing the Peace
and the Columbia, and of selling Columbia power to the United
States.224 Recognizing that development of British Columbia's water
resources could not easily take place without his consent he was in a
very strategic position. The federal government, on the other hand,
had signed a treaty with the United States and was exposed to the risk
of international embarrassment if the treaty was not ratified by Cana-
da. One solution suggested was that the federal government might
undertake the entire project, thus building and operating the dams,
much as the United States might do in a similar situation. However,
since the practice in Canada had in the past been different, and the
federal government did not wish to give the appearance of usurping
provincial authority, this idea was quickly shelved.
During this period of indecision, Mr. Bennett, acting with great
surprise, expropriated both the British Columbia Electric Company
and the Peace River Power Company.22 By this swift stroke he
significantly altered the political chess board in his favor.
As pointed out above, Mr. Bennett was faced with Ottawa's reluc-
tance to export power from British Columbia. At the same time, on his
home front, he had to contend with the reluctance of two large private
companies, the British Columbia Electric Company and the Peace
River Power Company, to go along with his scheme of simultaneous
development. The British Columbia Electric Company served the
'Vancouver (B.C.) Province, Jan. 24, 1963, p. 4, col. 3. (Supp.).
='But cf. Davie Fulton's testimony before the External Affairs Committee, 26th
Parl. Hearings 1118:
One point that should be emphasized is that this controversy developed only after
the treaty had been signed. ... It was not until after the treaty was signed that
any real question ... was raised. Then, not only was the question raised by the
government of British Columbia, but their position was completely reversed.
It became apparent that, instead of using Columbia River power including
downstream power as the next major source of hydro power to supply British
Columbia's requirements, the decision had been taken in Victoria to give
priority to the Peace river development for this purpose. This decision, hitherto
concealed, of course meant that the domestic British Columbia requirements
would be physically met by Peace river power (although at higher cost) and
that our share of Columbia power, if it was to be developed, must therefore be
sold en bloc in the United States.
Power Development Act, 1961, B.C. Stats. 1961, 2d Sess., c. 4, p. 39.
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lower mainland of British Columbia, the largest power market in the
province. As explained by Dr. Derrick Sewell, formerly an economist
with the Water Resources Branch of the Canadian Federal Govern-
ment and now at the University of Chicago:22
This company... indicated that it had cheaper alternative sources, such
as thermal power based on coal from the Hat Creek deposits. With an
embargo on the export of power, and with no immediate market in the
lower mainland, it is probable that the Peace River project would have
been shelved, for the time being at least.
The expropriation of both these companies provided Bennett with
the answer by bringing both the source of power from the Peace River,
and its potential market, into the hands of the provincial government.
That government immediately placed the assets of the expropriated
companies under the control of a newly-formed agency, The British
Columbia Power Corporation,22 7 which was instructed to carry out
Mr. Bennett's plans. The Peace River project was thus assured of the
lower mainland market.
Meanwhile, Mr. Bennett suggested that power from the Columbia
River project, which would now be surplus for at least twenty years228
in Canada, could be sold during that time to the United States. Reve-
nue from the sale could be used to finance dam construction in Canada
on the Columbia, leaving the British Columbia government free to
look elsewhere for Peace River financing. Thus, the federal govern-
ment was forced to accept a fait accompli, since the only possible
market for Columbia River power, other than in the United States,
was now under Bennett's control.
4. Agreement is Reached. The Canadian government was required
to change its policy on exporting power to the United States in Septem-
ber 1962229 thereby permitting resumption of negotiations with the
United States.
In the meantime, the details of the Ottawa-British Columbia agree-
ment had to be worked out. The responsibility for carrying out the
terms of the Treaty had to be clearly understood, as well as who was to
receive the benefits.23 ° Agreement including these points was finally
'Sewell, The Cohlnbia River Treaty and Protocol Agreement, 4 NATURAL rEs.
J. 309, 321-22 (1964).
-' This company has now combined with the British Columbia Power Commis-
sion and is called the B.C. Hydro and Power Authority. Power Development Act,
1961, B.C. Stats. 1961, 2d Sess., c. 4 as amended, B.C. Stats. 1962, c. 50, p. 251.
s Sewell, supra note 226, at 322.
Speech from the Throne (Can.), Sept. 1962.
See Presentation 32.
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reached, and signed on July 8, 1963.231 A supplemental agreement,
spelling out further details was concluded on January 13, 1964.232
It was now time for final agreement with the United States. In fact,
in the United States pressure had been mounting for some time to
"junk" the Columbia River Treaty and go it alone. Although it was
generally agreed south of the border that the Treaty plan was the
optimum one for the United States, each year that passed without
action meant a loss of power and revenue in the United States. Some
storage sites did exist in the United States, and voices were heard
urging their use as an alternative to the Canadian sites.23
If these sites had been actually employed, the chances for consum-
mating a treaty with Canada would have greatly lessened. The first-
added storage on a river has greatest value. Each project thereafter
has successively less value. Thus, if additional storage facilities were
built in the United States before the Treaty was signed, there would
be less incentive for the United States to concede Canada anything for
the upper Columbia storage. Undoubtedly, knowledge of the growing
restiveness south of the border spurred both the federal and provincial
Canadian governments to greater efforts in resolving their internal
dispute.
IX. THE PROTOCOL
A. Its Terms
Once British Columbia and the Canadian federal government had
reached accord it was essential that this agreement, or at least the
parts that concerned the United States, be incorporated into the Co-
lumbia River Treaty. The Treaty could, of course, be renegotiated,
but this would be embarrassing in the United States, where ratification
had already occurred. It was decided that a supplemental Protocol
would be preferable, making such alterations of the Treaty as were
essential and adding certain provisions. The additions were necessary
= Protocol and Related Documents 100.
Z'Id. at 107.Vancouver (B.C.) Province, Sept. 27, 1961, p. 19, col. 6.
In October, 1963, the State of Washington engaged H. Zinder & Associates to
study plans for the development of the Columbia-without the Canadian treaty. Under
an $8,000 contract the consulting firm studied both flood control and power develop-
ment in the basin. In announcing the study Earl Coe, Washington State Director of
Conservation said "We've heard constantly for the past three years that Canada was
about to ratify the treaty. Mr. Bennett has changed his mind on one pretext or another
each time it looked like Canada was going to sign." Public Power News (Seattle,
Wash.), Oct. 1963, p. 4, col. 1-2.
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to set out the terms of sale of Canada's downstream-power-entitlement
to the United States.
The Protocol Agreement established the terms of sale of Canada's
downstream benefits to the United States,234 and cleared away some
other objections that had been raised in Canada to the Treaty. On
October 1, 1964, the United States paid to Canada 254.4 million dollars
(United States) for Canada's downstream-power-entitlement during
the first thirty years of the Treaty. The 64.4 million dollars (United
States) provided in the Treaty for flood control benefits2 35 was also
paid at that time. These funds are sufficient to finance the construction
of the three Canadian Treaty projects, Mica Creek, High Arrow, and
Duncan Lake, as well as half the cost of generators for the Mica Dam.
It has been estimated that about 20 billion kilowatts of energy per
annum can thus be delivered to the Vancouver area at a total cost of
less than three mills per kilowatt-hour, or about half the present cost
of power in that area.236
The Protocol confirms the Treaty provision that Canada may divert
Columbia basin waters for irrigation, domestic, and industrial uses.237
This was originally unclear in the Treaty but was clarified here to show
exactly the circumstances under which diversion could occur. Specific-
ally, this provision assures the government of Saskatchewan avail-
ability of Columbia waters for use in the prairie province. That gov-
ernment has contended that water is in short supply there and must be
imported soon. The likelihood, however, of a transfer to Saskatchewan
from the Columbia seems remote in view of its relative high cost (10.5
dollars per acre-foot delivered to the prairie) compared to possibilities
of obtaining water from the Athabasca River (3.5 dollars per acre-
foot) or the Peace River (4.6 dollars).23
Under the Protocol, Canada's control over its own storage facilities
is confirmed: Canadians decide which reservoirs are to release water
for downstream power generation in the United States. The Protocol
also makes clear that United States "calls" for flood control storage
shall be made only in emergencies, i.e., when the flow at The Dallas,
Washington exceeds 600,000 cubic feet per second. In order that
"' Protocol and Related Documents 117-20.
Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Re-
sources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961 [1964], art. VI, para. 1, 15 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. vol. 2, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
23 Sewell, supra note 226, at 323.
Protocol and Related Documents 113.
See Crippen Wright Engineering Ltd., Report to Saskatchewan Power Corp.
(1962), summarized in Presentation 52-53.
[VOL. 41 : 676
CONTROVERSY OVER THE COLUMBIA
Canadian power generation shall not be unduly disturbed, the United
States agrees not to call for Canadian storage until all its own storage
facilities are being used to capacity.2 39 The protocol arrangement to
sell Canada's downstream benefits to the United States means, of
course, that these benefits will be utilized south of the border. Canada
will no longer require the standby service provided for in the Treaty,
and, of course, need not pay for it, thereby saving some 2 million
dollars per annum. 40
B. Action Required in the United States
1. Northwest to California Power Intertie. The sale of Columbia
power to the United States necessitated certain preparatory work
south of the border. First, a market for this power had to be found.
The Pacific Northwest had no current market for such large blocks of
power, and no transmission lines existed between the Northwest and
the potential markets in California.
It was therefore necessary to arrange for transmission lines to be
constructed to the south. This required a major policy change in the
United States. At that time no major power transmission lines crossed
the Oregon border into California. The people of the Pacific Northwest
had carefully kept all their power in their own region, fearing that if
they once permitted intertie connections with the powerful and rapidly
growing California markets, this power could never be recaptured. The
Northwest was eventually induced to go along with the intertie idea on
condition that a "preference" clause be enacted into law saying that, if
and when the Northwest needs and requests the power, it can have it,
the California markets notwithstanding. 41
2. United States Financing of Power Purchase. The United States
had to raise a lump sum of 254 million dollars (United States) to pur-
chase the Canadian share of the downstream benefits for the first thirty
years of the life of the Treaty. A non-profit corporation called the
Columbia Storage Power Exchange was formed to raise the necessary
funds and handle the sale of the Canadian power entitlement in the
United States. It issued some 330 million dollars in bonds and trans-
ferred 254 million dollars of the proceeds to Canada as advance pay-
ment for the power,2 42 on October 1, 1964 as provided in the protocol.
Protocol and Related Documents 111.
'Id. at 112.78 Stat. 756 (1964). For a discussion of some of the problems involved in
bringing about the California Intertie see Sewell, Regional Inter-Ties and National
Supergrids, Water Power, July 1963, p. 287.
" Public Power News (Seattle, Wash.) June 1964, p. 1, col. 3.
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X. THE TREATY GOES TO PARLIAMENT
After the two British Columbia-Canadian agreements had been
signed, the province became an enthusiastic supporter of the Treaty.
On the national level the out-of-office Conservative party might have
been expected to raise objections to the agreement, but it had been in
office when the Treaty was negotiated and thus was fully committed
to its support. When the hearings on the Treaty and Protocol were
held before the External Affairs Committee in March, April and May
1964, only a few dissenting voices were heard. Among them was the
economist, Mr. Larry Higgins, who presented a carefully prepared
brief and testimony against the Treaty;24 and General McNaughton,
who was the principal spokesman for the opposition.
Mr. Higgins was an economist with the Ontario Hydro Company. In 1958 he
was on loan to the Department of Trade and Commerce (Can.) from the Imperial
Tobacco Co. as a technical advisor and worked on an interdepartmental committee on
the Columbia River. Mr. Higgins criticized various aspects of the Treaty. In his
conclusions he said, 26th Parl. Hearings 883-84:
The provisions of the Columbia river treaty of 1961 and the protocol of 1964
are so interwoven that it is doubtful if they could be amended to produce a treaty
(VOL-. 41 : 676
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A. McNaughton Opposes
The General recommended in the strongest terms that the Treaty be
rejected. 44 He charged in his testimony that some of the Treaty pro-
visions were "shocking"24 in their unfairness to Canada, and took the
view that Canada should develop the Canadian section of the Columbia
basin unilaterally, acting jointly with the United States only where
some clear advantage to Canada could be shown. As far as he was
concerned no such advantage could be shown. In fact, he said: 46
I do take the strongest exception to reducing Canada to a state of a
storer of water for the United States. I think that would be a very, very
serious servitude to place on Canada.... To throw the burden of the
operation of the storages on Canada to the extent which is contemplated
and which will result from this, literally is suicide for Canada, and it
reduces it to a primitive country with all that goes with it.
After raising a number of specific objections to Treaty projects, he
offered his own "McNaughton" plan as a much preferred alternative.
This plan was essentially the "Dorr Diversion" scheme, one of the
three plans originally outlined by the 1959 Engineering Board report,
combined with the Low Arrow alternative, also suggested in that
report.
The General, as well as Mr. Higgins,2 47 objected to Libby Dam and
Canada's agreement to allow the Kootenay to flow south across the
border to service that dam. He said, "The effect [of this] is, I would
warn you [to permit] an immense irreplaceable resource of ever in-
creasing value to pass out from the sovereignty of Canada for no
proper return and for all time .... this is a most grievous matter. 248
He also argued that even for the United States the Libby project would
be an "extravagantly expensive matter which is strongly opposed by
which would protect Canada's legitimate interests and meet urgent requirements
in the United States.
Other arrangements could be made quickly involving the building of Mica
creek dam, Dorr dam, and the Bull river dam (for ultimate incorporation in the
Bull river-Luxor reservoir).
The treaty arrangements contain grave legal, economic and political defects.
In the interest of friendly relations with the United States in the long run,
and the safeguarding of irreplaceable Canadian assets for future generations, I
respectfully recommend that the standing committee on external affairs recom-
mend to the House of Commons that the Columbia river treaty and protocol be
rejected.
In general Mr. Higgins supported the McNaughton approach to the Columbia devel-
opment.
"' See Gen. McNaughton's extensive testimony, id. at Nos. 9-12, 26, 29.
"'Id. at 1324.
' Id. at 653.
"'See, e.g., id. at 875-77, 893-95, 911.
. Id. at 1320.
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responsible authorities in the United States .... ,,14' The United States,
he said, could only afford to build Libby on the assumption that
Canada would, directly as well as indirectly, carry "the burden of
this extravaganza."25 0
He protested the construction of High Arrow Dam on the ground
that it would destroy the "long established communities in the Arrow
Lakes area with nowhere available in the vicinity for their re-establish-
ment"; that it would "compromise recreational facilities through the
destruction of beaches, spawning beds for fish, cover for wildlife and
the like"; and that the size of the dam, combined with the unstable
terrain on which it was to be built, would necessitate "very elaborate
designs" and would result in a "very expensive" dam. He pointed out
that High Arrow provides "little advantage to Canada other than to
produce benefits to downstream power in the United States which
may be sold." 5'
The McNaughton plan, the General argued, would produce some
360,000 to 400,000 kilowatts more power in Canada than the Treaty
plan.252. It would keep greater control of the river in Canada, and
would not permit the steal by the United States that was about to occur
on flood control benefits under the Treaty plan.253
All the General's arguments were countered by government wit-
nesses and others favoring the Treaty plan. 54 A study by the Depart-
ment of Northern Affairs and National Resources, for example, showed
that the McNaughton plan might actually produce 68,000 kilowatts
less than the Treaty plan-with the Canal Flats diversion (possible
twenty years after the Treaty).255 In addition, of course, the Treaty
plan would bring Canada substantial downstream benefits from the
United States which the McNaughton plan would not.
Once again, as in the Ottawa-British Columbia fight of previous
years, the arguments rapidly became lost in a vast cloud of statistics,
understandable at best only to the experts. The public, and the politi-
cal decision-makers, had, of necessity, to rely on these experts rather
2
"' Ibid.
2'Ibid.
m Id. at 1321.
"Id. at 548.
Id. at 1318-42.
See the paragraph by paragraph rebuttal by the Water Resources Branch,
Department of Northern Affars and Natural Resources (Can.), id. at 1475-1503, im-
mediately following Gen. McNaughton's article The Proposed Columbia River
Treaty, reprinted id. at 1463-74. Numerous witnesses testified in favor of the Treaty
plan and against Gen. McNaughton's ideas.
- Vancouver (B.C.) Province, Jan. 24, 1963, p. 2, col. 4. (Supp.).
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than on the incomprehensible reams of data put before them. There
were, however, two aspects of General McNaughton's approach which
weakened it considerably in the eyes of many. It expressed, for exam-
ple, a strong "go-it-alone-Canada" philosophy, and reflected a deeply-
felt nationalism, as well as a distrust of the basic fairness of the
United States. This view was contrary to the prevailing Canadian
attitude, which tended to idealize the existing peaceful relationship
between the two countries, and sought to encourage further joint enter-
prises and international cooperation.
In addition General McNaughton was embarrassed by an incident
that took place in a meeting of the advisors to the negotiating team
(including General McNaughton) a few days before the signing of the
Treaty in 1961. The purpose of the meeting was to offer the advisors
an opportunity to raise objections to the Treaty plan. Mr. Davie
Fulton, chairman of the treaty negotiating team, announced that the
team was ready to recommend a treaty plan to the government and
asked the advisors, who were aware of the plan, "are you prepared to
join the recommendations of the treaty? ... Mr. Fulton said,
"Not one of those present opposed the recommendation that the Treaty
should be accepted and signed.' 257 He was reinforced by the journalist,
Paddy Sherman, who stated he "spoke to most of the advisors who
were at that meeting. They were unanimous that the General refused
to vote against recommending the plan."25 Fulton, who said he asked
the question mainly for McNaughton's benefit, claims the General
said he did not favor the treaty, as everyone knew, but that he would
not vote against it.2 5 9
When questioned on this point before the External Affairs Commit-
tee, General McNaughton had considerable difficulty explaining away
the inconsistency. For the most part, he claimed they did not tell the
whole truth.200 He indicated that he believed the appropriate place to
"
326th Parl. Hearings 652.
Id. at 572.
Vancouver (B.C.) Province, Jan. 24, 1963, p. 1, col. 4 (Supp.).
SIbid:
The question naturally arises: Why didn't he register such violent objections
when offered the opportunity by Fulton at the Ottawa advisors meeting? Also
why did he wait until his term as IJC chairman ended, 12 months after the treaty
was signed?
One explanation offered by a close confidante of the general's is that it took
McNaughton several months to grasp the fine points of the small print in the
Treaty. Others equally close to the Treaty and the IJC discussions reject this
excuse.
"'26th Parl. Hearings 572. Gen. McNaughton's own recollection of this crucial
meeting is as follows, id. at 652:
[W]hen Mr. Fulton pointed his pencil at me-and I can see it yet-and said
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voice his objections was before the External Affairs Committee, before
whom he was then speaking, hoping that no "positive action" would
be taken before he had a chance to express his views there.26  Need-
less to say, objections at such a late date could not possibly have as
much impact as they would have had if made prior to the signing of
the Treaty.
Yet, in the eyes of many Canadians, General McNaughton remained
the true hero of the negotiations, even though nearly all disagreed with
his negative attitude toward the Treaty. They could not forget his
determination and leadership in the early part of the negotiations,
when the United States had refused to concede anything; nor could
they forget that it was McNaughton's Fraser diversion scheme that
may have started the change in United States' attitude.2"2
B. Other Objectors
The small New Democratic Party joined General McNaughton in
voicing opposition to the Treaty,26 as did a few individuals. Local
opposition also arose from the residents of Arrow Valley which would
be flooded by the High Arrow reservoir. However, the forces urging
ratification were too powerful to be denied.
C. The Treaty is Approved
After three months of testimony before the External Affairs Com-
mittee, and a brief debate, the House of Commons voted on June 10,
1964, to approve both the Treaty and Protocol.
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Finding the origin of an international river dispute is often a difficult
and tedious task. Social, political, economic and technical issues be-
"are you prepared to join the recommendations of this treaty?" or something of
the sort, I said "no". And I may have expressed some words of annoyance after
to the effect of "to hell with the likes of this thing," or something like that. I do
not recollect now, but I do know I was very positive.
I know that immediately after the meeting I took occasion to let people know
at that time I was hoping that this business would get before this committee
before any positive action was taken, and I made it very clear that I felt it my
duty to Canada to oppose this treaty with the provisions it had in it by every
means which were open to me, and I have held to that view consistently ever
since.
" Ibid.
' British Columbia newspapers reflected this view in articles headlined
"McNaughton's Trump Card Had U.S. Running Scared," and "General Bluffed on
Weak Hand in Columbia Deal." Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Jan. 1964.
-Vancouver (B.C.) Sun, Jan. 25, 1964, p. 1, col. 6; March 4, 1964, p. 3, col. 5-6;
March 6, 1964, p. 16, col. 1-2. Bert Herridge, M.P. for Kootenay West, was the most
quoted N.D.P. critic. He claimed the Treaty was a "sellout" of Canadian resources to
the United States.
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come so confused as to defy rational analysis. This is not, however,
true of the Columbia River controversy. Both the starting event and
the causes of the disagreement can be traced with relative ease. It all
started when the United States applied to the International Joint
Commission for approval of Libby Dam, and did not include in the
application an offer to share with Canada the benefits to be derived
from the 150 feet of "head" that would be located in Canada. Cana-
dian objections opened the conflict that continued until the Treaty was
ratified in 1964. Although the focal point of the dispute shifted from
Libby Dam to encompass the whole of the Columbia basin, the basic
issue remained the same throughout, i.e., should the United States
share the downstream benefits made possible by Canadian storage?
In a broad way the moves and countermoves of the countries can be
summarized as follows. In 1951 the United States applied to the Inter-
national Joint Commission for permission to construct Libby Dam.
Canada objected, holding up the application on the ground that the
United States should share with Canada the downstream benefits. In
1953 and 1954 the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation nego-
tiated with the government of British Columbia and the federal
Canadian government in discussions aimed at permitting the corpora-
tion to build Arrow Lakes Dam.
By 1955 both Canada and the United States had recognized the
substantial benefits Canadian storage might bestow on the United
States. However neither side could understand the other's arbitrary
position on the matter of sharing these benefits. The Canadians said
it would be unfair to them if they were to build a series of dams giving
the United States extensive power and flood control benefits unless the
latter shared them with Canada. The United States argued to the
contrary, that it should not suffer for the accident of history through
which its own development of the lower part of the river was first; i.e.,
it should not have to pay Canada for incidental benefits that probably
would have been free if Canadian development had been earlier.
As is often the case with international river disputes, there was no
rule or principle of law that provided a neat formula for settlement.
Yet international law played a major role in the dispute, and received
a great deal of attention by lawyers, statesmen, and others throughout.
The question of what legal principles ought to apply to this and
similar disputes provided the focal point for lengthy debates and num-
erous articles. Because of the time, talent and energy devoted to these
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writings, a survey of those areas where a concensus was reached is
especially useful.
The Harmon Doctrine suffered an ignominious rout during the con-
troversy. Although most lawyers and statesmen on both sides of the
border agreed that article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty incorpo-
rated this doctrine, they also agreed that it was not appropriate for
resolution of the Columbia problem. Application of the Harmon Doc-
trine would have made joint planning and development an impossibil-
ity. This principle, it was felt, expressed a philosophy of absolute
sovereignty more in tune with the pre-industrial revolution era of the
eighteen and nineteenth centuries than with the close economic, social
and political ties that characterize our present, rapidly shrinking world.
Similarly the municipal law systems of riparian and appropriative
rights were subjected to extensive scrutiny by legal scholars and others,
and were rejected as inadequate for the task. This view, incidentally,
was consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions in inter-
state water cases during the past thirty years, where the riparian and
appropriation theories were rejected in favor of the more flexible equit-
able apportionment principle. Equitable apportionment thus emerged
as the widely favored principle. This concept, embodying the notion
of fair sharing, was extolled almost without exception by lawyers,
scholars, and statesmen on both sides of the border. They did not
agree on whether it was already an accepted principle of international
law, but they did agree that it should be.
The equitable apportionment concept played an important part in
the resolution of the Columbia dispute. As applied here it was not
thought to set a rigid formula for settlement. Rather it set a tone
and created an atmosphere that made negotiations easier and permitted
compromise of even the most knotty problems. Once the disputants
had accepted equitable apportionment as their basic premise, they were
encouraged, if not required, to move away from extreme positions
toward the middle range of alternatives more acceptable to the other
side. Given this climate for negotiations, the specific plan of the Treaty
had to be thrashed out in the political arena. Each side wanted some-
thing the other had; they simply had to negotiate the price of the
trade.
The legal argument arising out of the diversion question, which
centered on whether article II of the 1909 treaty incorporated the
Harmon Doctrine, turned out to be less important later than it seemed
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at the time. We now know that Canada probably never would have
diverted the Columbia, regardless of what course of action the United
States had taken. The primary restraints on Canada were economic
and political, not legal. Not only would the cost of electrical power
from the Fraser diversion be higher compared to that from alternative
sources, but diversion would also damage or destroy the valuable
Fraser River salmon runs.
Nonetheless, the diversion issue did accomplish something: It
brought wide public attention and interest to bear on the Columbia
conflict. The intensity of interest engendered in the United States
brought home to the Canadians the potential importance of the upper
Columbia to the United States, the huge costs and potential benefits
to Canada connected with the development, and the permanent, ir-
reversible nature of any international cooperation arrangement. Along
with this increased understanding, came the notion that Canadian
federal as well as provincial interests were involved, and that the
federal government should be a participant in any agreement with
the United States. This was the reason that Parliament, in 1955,
passed the International River Improvements Act requiring federal
licenses for all dams or other works on international rivers. That act
served to unify and possibly strengthen the Canadian position, but it
did not bring any change in the United States' refusal to share down-
stream benefits. Canada had to improve its bargaining position yet
further. Not long thereafter, the Canadians came up with the Peace
River alternative. The United States soon realized that if this alterna-
tive plan was adopted, the upper Columbia might lie fallow for many
years.
By this time, the United States had awakened to the potential
benefits that might be derived from Canadian storage, and conversely
the loss it might suffer if Canadian action were long delayed. The
Americans knew that if the Peace River proved adequate to supply
British Columbia's energy needs for several years, the loss to the
United States could be very great. It was apparent that unilateral
Canadian development of the upper Columbia would not necessarily
maximize the river's benefits. Accordingly, the United States was
interested in coordinated development, as well as coordinated opera-
tion. The wrong set of dams, or the right set of dams operated in the
wrong way, could mean considerable loss of power and flood control
in the United States.
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With the United States thus convinced of the desirability of coor-
dinated development and the apparent necessity of paying for it, the
negotiators were finally able in 1960 to arrive at agreement on a set of
guiding principles. These were later incorporated into the 1961 Treaty.
This still, however, left unresolved the Ottawa-British Columbia quar-
rel over who was to pay for the facilities, and exactly what was to be
done with Canada's downstream-power-entitlement.
The Canadian federal government initially was opposed to the
sale of any of this power-entitlement to the United States. The power,
it argued, could best be used for industrial growth in Canada. How-
ever, Premier Bennett of British Columbia wanted the Peace River
developed simultaneously with the Columbia, and insisted that such
development would necessitate the sale of Columbia River power to the
United States. The funds from the sale would help finance dams on
the Columbia so that British Columbia's other financial resources could
be freed for the Peace River. Otherwise it would not be possible to
finance development of both rivers at the same time.
Premier Bennett outmaneuvered his federal opponent in this con-
flict by (1) expropriating the privately owned Peace River Power
Company so that he controlled the source of power from the Peace
River, and (2) expropriating the privately owned British Columbia
Electric Company so that he controlled the market for this power.
At that point, unless the federal government wished to renege on its
treaty with the United States, it had to go along with Bennett's plan.
This it finally agreed to do.
Subsequent negotiations with the United States established the price
and other terms of sale. Inside the United States arrangements were
made for financing the purchase and for building the long distance
transmission lines necessary to wheel the power to the big California
markets. A supplemental agreement, the 1964 Protocol, was executed
embodying these new arrangements.
It would be remiss to conclude this study without noting one of the
relevant but often overlooked aspects of the United States-Canadian
relations that had a direct bearing on the Columbia dispute, i.e., the
tendency of the Americans to overlook and take for granted Canadian
attitudes and problems. The reason is not difficult to determine. Amer-
ican newspapers, magazines, television, movies, and radio report ex-
haustively on events inside the United States. With some exceptions,
they devote comparatively little time to news from north of the border.
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These news media are so numerous and disseminate such quantities of
United States news to the north, that their Canadian counterparts
simply cannot meet the overwhelming competition. The result is that
the American public often remains uninformed about its northern neigh-
bor, whereas Canadians, like it or not, are kept quite abreast of atti-
tudes, conditions and problems in the United States.
In part, this situation explains the surprise in the United States at
Canada's insistence on payment for, or sharing of downstream benefits.
The American public, as well as others in the United States who might
have been expected to know better, were unaware whether Canada had
even built any facilities on the upper Columbia. Development of the
United States portion of the river had been carried forward with so
little regard for what might have resulted upstream that one knowl-
edgeable writer commented "it is as if the Columbia surged full-blown
from some underground cavern at the boundary." One can speculate
that this ignorance south of the border was one of the reasons why
the Americans took such a negative view of the question of sharing
downstream benefits. When they became better informed, they were
inclined to concede that Canada had some basis for its claims.
Many factors contributed to this process of educating the American
public, not the least of which were the activities of the International
Joint Commission and the publicity given the heated controversy
between General McNaughton and Mr. Len Jordan. Two other con-
tributing events were the two international law conferences held in
Seattle, Washington in 1956 and 1958. These meetings, organized by
Dr. Charles Martin of the University of Washington, were well at-
tended and widely reported in the American press. The excellent
papers presented covered nearly all the major international issues in
the dispute, and assisted materially in bringing to the American audi-
ence the Canadian viewpoint.
Still another facet of Canadian-United States relations which played
a part in setting the tone of the conflict was the Canadian fear of the
disparate economic and political power of the United States. Many
Canadians fear that too close cooperation might bring about a gradual
loss of identity of Canada and of Canadian institutions. Some of the
more fearful even suggest that to ask Canada to cooperate closely with
the United States is like asking a rabbit to cooperate with a fox.
This fear for Canadian independence was one of the major hurdles
deterring joint development of the Columbia. General McNaughton,
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as well as many other Canadians, felt that Canada would be better
off "going it alone," lest the United States gradually come to control
still another important segment of the Canadian economy. Despite
this concern, however, the mainstream of both Canadian and American
thought gradually turned toward the concept of joint planning. It
accepted the argument that development of the basin should be ma-xi-
mized from an engineering and economic point of view, and the bound-
ary should be used only to determine the division of benefits; otherwise
both countries would suffer irreparable economic loss.
A. The Basin Approach to River Development
The resolution of the Columbia dispute illustrates that the basin
approach to river development has advantages in some areas, and
seems to make little difference in others. For power generation, the
most economically valuable use of the Columbia, the advantages of
integrated basin planning are clear. The great seasonal fluctuation in
the flow of the river means that its firm power-producing capacity is
small when the flow is unregulated. To even-out the flow requires
storage reservoirs, and these obviously must be located in the basin.
On the Columbia the best sites for storage, other than at Grand
Coulee, axe in Canada. Integrated planning is thus essential for opti-
mum power development.
On the other hand, the distribution of power has little to do with the
basin as such. Once power is generated it can be wheeled anywhere.
Some of the largest consumers of Columbia power are located outside
the basin. Under the 1964 agreement, much of this power will be
wheeled from the Northwest to the large population and industrial
centers in Southern California, a distance of over 700 miles from the
basin.
Flood control is also best accomplished under basin planning, and
for much the same reasons. Control of flooding on the Columbia calls
for a storage capacity of 18 to 21 million acre-feet. This might con-
ceivably be provided inside the United States on tributaries to the
river; however, the cost of doing so would apparently be greater than
if Canadian sites were utilized.
For irrigation, navigation, fishing and recreation, basin planning is
considerably less important. Although substantial recreational plans
have been developed over the past few years within the basin, es-
pecially concerning that part within the United States, there is little
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evidence to show that joint international planning provides any signifi-
cant advantages over unilateral action.
These observations suggest the need for a careful analysis of each
function to be performed in a river basin or in the overall region.
Power generation and flood control probably will be found to require
basin planning and action, whereas there is less likelihood that other
functions will benefit from such coordinated action.
B. The Role of the International Joint Commission
The International Joint Commission played a significant role in the
Columbia River dispute. It will be recalled that the issue of joint
development was referred to the Commission as early as 1944, and
remained with that organization throughout the period of controversy,
until its final report in 1959. Although during this period the Com-
mission was criticized for its slowness and lack of imagination, it none-
theless performed several useful functions. For example, it conducted
an investigation of the facts, gathering and sifting a mountain of
technical data; for a time it provided a forum for a continuing dialogue
(and thus public education) about the issues; and it evaluated various
proposals made during the course of negotiations, and eventually
identified a formula from which the treaty plan was devised.
C. The Future
The Treaty envisions an era of extensive international cooperation
on the Columbia for at least sixty years. During this period, both
countries must work closely together to maximize the power and flood
control benefits from Canadian storage. The Permanent Engineering
Board, created to administer the arrangements under the Treaty, will
provide a continuing point of contact, information exchange, and de-
cision making.
Beyond these specific arrangements there is little doubt that the
Columbia controversy, with its peaceful settlement, helped to continue
the excellent relations of the two nations that have characterized their
contacts over the past century. On both sides of the border there is a
better understanding of the attitudes, problems and hopes of those
living across it, and there is a better understanding of the economic
advantages that can accrue to both sides through intelligent coopera-
tion.
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